УДК 94:355.02«17/18» **DOI** https://doi.org/10.26661/zhv-2021-4-56-02

THE POLICY OF THE CRIMEAN KHANATE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OTTOMAN-MOSCOW CONFRONTATION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XVIITH CENTURY – EARLY XVIII CENTURIES

K. Sizarev
Bogdan Khmelnytskyi Melitopol State Pedagogical University
konsizar@gmail.com
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2476-2355

Key words: Crimean Khanate, Ottoman Empire, Moscow state, politics, Moscow-Turkish war, Chigirin campaigns, Ottoman army, peace treaty.

The article attempts to illuminate the policy of the Crimean Khanate in the context of the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow state during the second half of the XVIIth century – early XVIII centuries. It is noted that the authorities of the Crimean Khanate were not only dependent on the Ottoman state, but also used in every possible way certain advantages of this protectorate. It is indicated that during the reign of Sophia Alekseevna, relations between the Moscow state and the Ottoman Empire acquire a new character, in particular, the Moscow army launched offensive operations against Turkish possessions in the Crimea, whereas previously its actions were of a defensive nature. It is emphasized that the reason for this was the joining of the Moscow state to the sacred alliance against the Turks, which was concluded in 1683 between the Polish king Jan Sobieski and the Austrian emperor Leopold. It is noted that the allies sought to expel the Turks from Europe and decided to attract other states to the union, in particular the Muscovy. The article analyzes the Moscow-Turkish war of 1672–1681, in particular – the Chigirin campaigns of the Ottoman army in 1677 and 1678, and the Moscow-Turkish war of 1686–1700, including the Crimean campaigns of Moscow in 1687 and 1689. It is noticed that the Wild Field of the Crimean Khanate served as an interstate buffer zone. It was a significant obstacle to the military invasion of Crimea from land through Perekop. It was concluded that the Moscow-Turkish war of 1686–1700, as a component of the Great Turkish War of 1683–1699, ended in 1700, as a result, the Treaty of Constantinople was signed. It is noted that this treaty ensured the neutrality of the Ottoman state and allowed Peter I to start the Northern War, accordingly – it meant the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

ПОЛІТИКА КРИМСЬКОГО ХАНСТВА В КОНТЕКСТІ ОСМАНСЬКО-МОСКОВСЬКОГО ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ У ДРУГІЙ ПОЛОВИНІ XVII – НА ПОЧАТКУ XVIII СТ.

К. К. Сізарєв
Мелітопольський державний педагогічний університет імені Богдана Хмельницького
konsizar@gmail.com
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2476-2355

Ключові слова: Кримське ханство, Османська імперія, Московська держава, політика, московсько-турецька війна, Чигиринські походи, Османська армія.

У статті зроблена спроба висвітлити політику Кримського ханства в умовах протистояння Османської імперії та Московської держави впродовж другої половини XVII – початку XVIII ст. Відзначено, що влада Кримського ханату була не лише залежною від Оттоманської держави, але й всіляко

використовувала певні переваги цього протекторату. Підсумовано, що московсько-турецька війна 1686–1700 рр., як складова Великої турецької війни 1683–1699 рр. завершилася в 1700 р. підписанням Константинопольського мирного договору.

Problem statement. For the Russian Empire in political relations with the Ottoman Empire, access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas was one of the main tasks at the end of the XVIIth century. and further throughout the XVIIIth century. At that time, the Russian state did not fully fulfill this task. However, over the past more than two hundred years, Russia has sought to atone for its imperial ambitions at any cost. According to the Russian emperors, Russia can get a real outlet to the Black Sea not when their state launches its ships into the waters of the Azov and Black Seas, but when the state builds ports and cities on these seashores. And this problem directly related to the existence of the Crimean Khanate.

The analysis of sources and recent researches. Consideration of the subjects of the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate, to a certain extent, was started by the following authors: D. Bagaliy[1], S. Velychko[2], V. Gorobets[3], V. Karantsevich[4], O. Rigelman[5], T. Chukhlib[6] etc. However, the problems of the Crimean Khanate in the Ottoman-Moscow confrontation during the second half of the XVII – early XVIII centuries. remains, in general, unresolved.

The publication's purpose. The article is devoted to the characteristics of the policy of the Crimean Khanate in the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow state during the second half of the XVII – early XVIII centuries.

Statement of the basic material. The study of the specifics of the policy of the Crimean Khanate in the context of its existence between the Ottoman Empire and the Moscow state requires a particularly balanced approach involving various methods of thinking and the use of typological, diachronic and synchronic modifications, which the comparative method can provide. In particular, it is important to define the interstate relations of the Crimean Khanate with the Ottoman Empire, the Moscow State, the Commonwealth and Hetman Ukraine. Among other things – by comparing and forming certain historical models and reconstructing the typology of the development of society[7].

Since the National Liberation War of Ukraine against Poland, the geopolitics between the Ottoman Empire, Rzeczpospolita and Muscovy has undergone significant changes. It is quite obvious that despite the certain dependence of the Khanate on the Ottoman state, the Crimean Khanate strove to become an independent player in these geopolitical relations. And so historically it happened that, basically, events developed in the Ukrainian lands. And very often the Crimean Tatars, participating in hostilities on the side of various warring parties, sought to weaken one side or the other. So, in the decisive period of the confrontation between the hetman Ukraine and the Commonwealth, the Crimean Khan betrays his traditional ally – Bogdan Khmelnitsky and concludes an alliance with Poland. One of the reasons for this decision was that the Crimean Khan learned about the intention of the Moscow state to take the Ukrainian Cossack-hetman statehood under his own patronage. Under such conditions, Poland and the Crimean Khanate decided to conclude an alliance for a joint struggle with the Moscow state. But already hetman Ivan Vyhovsky turned to the Crimean Tatars for help in the struggle against the Moscow kingdom. However, the involvement of the Crimean Khanate in this difficult, conflicting political situation had fatal consequences for Ukraine – the Crimean Tatars began to take many Ukrainians prisoner without hindrance[8].

[1] Багалій Д. І. Історія Слобідської України. Харків : Основа, 1991. 256 с.

[2] Величко С. В. Літопис / пер. з книжної української мови; за ред. О. В. Мишанича. К. : Дніпро, 1991. Т. 2. 642 с.

[3] Горобець В. Мрія, утоплена в підозрілості й образах, або Чому таким коротким було життя українсько-польської унії 1659 року? Війни і мир, або «Українці – поляки: брати/вороги, сусіди» / За заг. ред. Л. Івшиної; Упоряд. : В. Горобець, В. Панченко, Ю. Шаповал. К. : АТЗТ Українська прес-група, 2004. С. 94–108.

[4] Каранцевич В. Л. Битва під Конотопом. К. : ІНТЕР ПРОЕКТ, 2012. 120 с.

[5] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. 768 с.

[6] Чухліб Т. В. Бахчисарайський мир 1681 р. дата публікації: 2003 р. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=Bakhchysarajskyj_myr_1681

[7] Каганов Ю. О. Історична компаративістика крізь призму філософсько-методологічного погляду. Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету, 2010. Вип. XXIX. С. 255.

[8] Горобець В. Мрія, утоплена в підозрілості й образах, або Чому таким коротким було життя українсько-польської унії 1659 року? Війни і мир, або «Українці – поляки: брати/вороги, сусіди» / За заг. ред. Л. Івшиної; Упоряд. : В. Горобець, В. Панченко, Ю. Шаповал. К. : АТЗТ Українська прес-група, 2004. С. 97.

With the coming to power of the hetman Vyhovsky, the Zaporozhye Host reacted negatively to the contacts of this hetman with the Crimean Khanate. But the government of Hetman I. Vyhovsky still managed to achieve a policy of neutrality with Crimea[9]. In August 1658 Vyhovsky with a 20,000-strong army and a horde of Kalga set off for the Dnieper. There the Tatars operated mostly autonomously. Having received an order from the Crimean Khan to approach the Moscow borders from the south, the Nogais, Azov and Kuban Tatars devastated the outskirts of many cities of the Belgorod strip. The Cossacks of the Chernigov and Nizhyn regiments were also active[10]. And in the battle near Konotop, the Ukrainian-Polish army, with the support of the thirty thousandth army of the Crimean khan Mehmed IV Giray, won a landslide victory over the 100 thousandth army of Moscow, led by Aleksey Trubetskoy[11].

However, the neutrality between the Crimean Khanate and the hetman Vyhovsky was unstable. The real then military-political situation in the Central-Eastern region of Europe developed in such a way that it was the army of the Crimean Khanate that was the most potential military ally of Hetman Vyhovsky. But after the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654, for Vyhovsky a stable alliance with the Crimean Khanate was impossible without peace with Poland. After all, the Polish-Crimean alliance retained its strength, and it was impossible for the Ukrainian hetman in 1654 to receive help from the Crimean Khan, being at war with the Polish king[12].

As a result of the conclusion of the Andrusovo truce in 1667 between Poland and the Muscovite kingdom, the interests of Ukraine were significantly violated. Therefore, Hetman P. Doroshenko decided to conclude a military alliance with the Crimean Khanate and go under the political protectorate of the Ottoman state. Consequently, Hetman Doroshenko, in alliance with the Tatars, begins a war against the Poles[13]. During September 1667, several tens of thousands of Tatars, led by Kerim-Giray, with the support of several thousand Ottoman Janissaries and Hetman Doroshenko, began the conquest of Galicia. The Polish king Jan Sobieski did not have sufficient strength to resist this offensive. However, he was supported by the Zaporozhye koshevoy Ivan Sirko, who with the Cossacks attacked the Northern Crimea, which caused considerable concern among the Tatars. And already on October 16, 1667, Kerim-Girey alone (without the consent of the allies) began negotiations with Jan Sobieski, which led to the conclusion of the Podgaetsky Peace Agreement[14]. The Crimean Tatars, whom P. Doroshenko left for the winter in Ukraine after a successful war against Poland, rebelled against him. And, having captured many prisoners, they returned to the Crimea. The hetman complained about this to the Turkish sultan. However, in vain – the Ottomans were quite on the side of the Crimean Tatars[15]. In fact, the power of the Crimean Khanate was not only dependent on the Ottoman state, but also used this protectorate in every possible way. Building their foreign policy in such a way that in the event of any interstate conflicts, enlist the support of the Ottoman Empire, or use its authority.

Famous Turkish writer, theologian, statesman and traveler Evliya Evliya Celebi (1611–1682), who visited the Ukrainian lands and the territory of the Crimean Khanate in the second half of 1660, in his «Book of Travels», to a certain extent, highlighted the then policy of the Crimean khans Islyam Girey and Mehmed Girey. Evliya Celebi also noted that in 1669 Hetman P. Doroshenko received from the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV the title of sanjakbey (bey of the Ukrainian sanjak)[16].

In general, it should be noted that Sultan Mehmed IV, whose mother was Ukrainian, purposefully pursued a policy of maintaining close contacts with Ukraine and largely supported the hetmans of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, Yuri Khmelnitsky, Pavel Teteru, Ivan Bryukhovetsky, and especially Petro Doroshenko.

Starting from the middle of 1672, a long Moscow-Turkish war begins, the first stage of which (1672–1676), Mostly, meant the struggle of the Ot-

[9] Горобець В. Мрія, утоплена в підозрілості й образах, або Чому таким коротким було життя українсько-польської унії 1659 року? Війни і мир, або «Українці – поляки: брати/вороги, сусіди» / За заг. ред. Л. Івшиної; Упоряд. : В. Горобець, В. Панченко, Ю. Шаповал. К. : АТЗТ Українська прес-група, 2004. С. 101.

[10] Каранцевич В. Л. Битва під Конотопом. К. : ІНТЕР ПРОЕКТ, 2012. С. 53.

[11] Літопис Самовидця / упор.: Я. І. Дзира. К. : Наук. думка, 1971. С. 80–82.

[12] Горобець В. Мрія, утоплена в підозрілості й образах, або Чому таким коротким було життя українсько-польської унії 1659 року? Війни і мир, або «Українці – поляки: брати/вороги, сусіди» / За заг. ред. Л. Івшиної; Упоряд. : В. Горобець, В. Панченко, Ю. Шаповал. К. : АТЗТ Українська прес-група, 2004. С. 101, 102.

[13] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. С. 381, 382.

[14] Величко С. В. Літопис / пер. з книжної української мови; за ред. О. В. Мишанича. К. : Дніпро, 1991. Т. 2. С. 74, 75.

[15] Багалій Д. І. Історія Слобідської України. Харків : Основа, 1991. С. 27.

[16] Челеби Эвлия. Книга путешествия. Т. 1 Земли Молдавии и Украины; пер. под ред. А.С. Тверитиновой. М. : Наука. 1961. URL: http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus8/Celebi3/text5.phtml?id=1731 (дата звернення: 15.08.2020).

toman Empire with the Commonwealth. Already in 1672, the Moscow army began an offensive against Ukraine – against the Ukrainian hetman Petro Doroshenko, allied to the Turks[17]. In this situation, Hetman Doroshenko counted on the support of the Crimean Khanate. The united army, led by Sultan Mehmed IV, together with the Crimean Khan Selim I Giray and Hetman P. Doroshenko, took the Kamenets fortress and moved in the direction of Galicia. And by the beginning of September 1672 this army besieged Lviv. Unable to continue the war, the Rzeczpospolita on October 5, 1672 agreed to conclude the Buchatsky peace treaty of 1672. The conclusion of the Buchatsky treaty, according to which the Rzeczpospolita renounced claims to the Right-Bank Ukraine, the Moscow state regarded as an opportunity, without violating the Andrusov armistice with the Rzeczpospolita, to seize the Right Bank of Ukraine.

In the mid-1670s military operations were conducted mainly on Ukrainian lands. In particular, in June 1674 the Ottoman-Tatar army, led by the vizier Kara-Mustafa, went on the offensive against Chigirin to support Petro Doroshenko, a vassal of the Ukrainian state. This forced the Moscow army to retreat under the command of the governor Grigory Romodanovsky, together with the left-bank hetman Ivan Samoilovich, who were besieging the capital of the Ukrainian hetman state – Chigirin. And in 1674, when the Peace of Zhuravnensky was concluded, the Ottoman Empire determined the landmark of the offensive to the northeast. This direction became more active in March 1677, when Yu. Khmelnitsky was taken from Istanbul to the Turkish camp on the Danube, where the army was preparing to march on the Ukraine. On behalf of Yu. Khmelnitsky, the Turkish command sent out station wagons throughout Ukraine, in which everyone who wished to join him was called on. It was noted that the Turks are going to protect Ukraine from robberies, insults and violence from the Tatars[18]. It is obvious that in the conditions of the growing Ottoman-Moscow confrontation with the authorities of the Ottoman state, it was beneficial to demonstrate oneself as an ally of the Ukrainian state of Petro Doroshenko and a defender of the Ukrainian people. However, in fact, the Turks disdained not only the Ukrainians, but as further events at the end of August 1677 showed, even the life of the Crimean Tatars did not bother them.

In June 1677, the koshevoy ataman of the Zaporizhzhya Sich, Ivan Sirko, reported on the advance of the Crimean Tatars on the Muravskaya road towards the borders of Muscovy. This information was confirmed by the field guards of Belgorod. And according to intelligence information of Hetman Ivan Samoilovich, the Turks at the end of June 1677 crossed the Danube and approached the Bug, where the Crimean Khan with his hordes was supposed to join them[19]. S. Velichko in his «Chronicle» wrote that the Turkish Sultan sent a decree to the Crimean Khan, so that he also arrived in due time near Chigirin with all the Crimean, Belgorod, Budzhak and other hordes[20]. Having crossed the Danube and having overcome the Prut and Dniester, the army of the seraskir (field marshal) Ibrahim Pasha Shaitan approached the Southern Bug. In the Budzhatsky steppes, it was joined by four thousand Belgorod Tatars, five hundred horsemen of the Crimean Khan Selim-Girey, headed by the sons of Khan Azmamet-Girey-Soltan[21].

A fairly valuable source of this research is the «Diary» of Patrick Gordon, a Scotsman who was in the service of the Moscow state and in 1677 led the dragoon regiment during the First Chigirin campaign. P. Gordon received information from intelligence and defectors, testified about the intentions of the Ottoman field army to attack Chigirin, and after its capture – to go to Kiev. At the same time, he estimates the number of the Ottoman army at 100 thousand, not counting the Tatars[22]. The leaders of the Ottoman army intended to seize the Right-Bank Ukraine by the fall of 1677. They were convinced that when their huge army appeared, Chigirin would not withstand, and the army of G. Romodanovsky and I. Samoilovich would not be able to cross the Dnieper and come to the aid of this fortress. However, such plans turned out to be a significant tactical miscalculation of the Turks[23]. The main forces of the Ottoman army: 80,000 Turks and 30,000 Tatars led by the Crimean Khan (except for about 10,000 representatives of other peoples) were never able to

[17] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. С. 414, 415.

[18] Літопис Самовидця / упор.: Я. І. Дзира. К. : Наук. думка, 1971. С. 128.

[19] Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографической комиссией: [В 15-ти т.] (далі – АЮЗР). СПб., 1861–1892. Т. 13: 1677–1678. СПб. : Тип. А. М. Котомина и К. 1884. С. 156–157, 179–180.

[20] Величко С. В. Літопис / пер. з книжної української мови; за ред. О. В. Мишанича. К. : Дніпро, 1991. Т. 2. С. 214.

[21] Акты, относящиеся к истории Южной и Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографической комиссией: [В 15-ти т.] (далі – АЮЗР). СПб., 1861–1892. Т. 13: 1677–1678. СПб. : Тип. А. М. Котомина и К. 1884. С. 247–249.

[22] Гордон П. Дневник. 1677–1678 / Ред. М. Р. Рыженков. М.: Наука, 2005. С. 19.

[23] Заруба В. Н. Украинское казацкое войско в борьбе с турецко-татарской агрессией (последняя четверть XVII в.). Х.: Основа, 1993. С. 35.

capture Chigirin[24]. In general, the First Chigirin campaign of the Ottoman army, which took place in the summer of 1677 and in which more than 120,000 soldiers took part under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha Shaitan, ended in failure for her. She was opposed by only 32,000 of the Moscow army of the governor of Romodanovsky and 20–25 thousand of the Cossacks of hetman Samoilovich[25]. According to the testimony of A. I. Rigelman, in the battle for Chigirin, only at the end of August 1677, 10,000 Tatars died, including seven murzas and the khan's son[26].

The second Chigirin campaign of the Ottoman army in 1678 also did not bring it a significant victory. This time, 200,000 Ottoman and Tatar troops, led by the Seraskir and Grand Vizier Kara-Mustafa Pasha, could not completely overcome about twelve thousand of the Moscow-Cossack troops. Almost the only success of the Turks was the destruction of the hetman capital – Chigirin. According to V. Zaruba, in the campaign of 1678 the Ottoman forces would have also failed if it had not been for the too great slowness and caution of G. Romodanovsky and I. Samoilovich[27]. After the end of the campaign in 1678, the Moscow-Turkish conflict continued during 1679–1680, albeit without large-scale military campaigns and actions. The final point in the solution of the confrontation between the two powerful states was put only by the Peace of Bakhchisarai, concluded in January 1681[28].

At the beginning of the summer of 1680, the Crimean Khan with large hordes moved in the direction of the Belgorod line, which was supposed to defend this territory from the attacks of the Tatars. As a result of the Tatars' campaign, several Ukrainian districts and Moscow settlements were destroyed[29]. In the summer of the same year, Ivan Sirko died, who for several decades was the main threat to the Crimean Khanate, having carried out more than 55 successful campaigns[30]. Consequently, the death of Ivan Sirko significantly intensified the anti-Moscow policy of the Crimean Khanate.

In the autumn of the same 1680, the Moscow tsar sent to the Crimea the steward Vasily Tyapkin and the clerk Nikita Zotov for negotiations on the conclusion of the Bakhchisarai peace treaty. Thus, as a result of the Moscow-Turkish war of 1672–1681. The Bakhchisarai peace treaty of 1681 between Moscow and Turkey and the Crimean Khanate was concluded, which once again redistributed Ukrainian lands between neighboring states and significantly strengthened the position of the Moscow state on the southern borders. The end of the Moscow-Turkish war established: a truce for twenty years, the Dnieper River became a border river, but the Russian government was forbidden to build fortifications on both banks. The parties did not have the right to build or restore fortifications in the neutral zone between the Bug and the Dnieper, to settle these lands, to accept defectors. The Tatars retained the right to roam and hunt in the steppe areas on both sides of the Dnieper. Podillia and the Southern Kiev region remained under the rule of Turkey. Moscow pledged to pay tribute to the Crimean Khan annually. An agreement was reached on the periodic exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the conclusion of the peace, Mehmed IV began to strengthen his power in the Right-Bank Ukraine, giving it to the Moldavian master G. Duke, who, contrary to the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, allowed new settlers to settle here. The final version of the treaty was ratified by the Sultan in April 1682 in Istanbul[31]. As for Zaporozhye, the Moscow representatives V. Tyapkin and M. Zotov could not achieve its accession to their state either in negotiations with the Crimean Khan Murad-Giray, or with Sultan Mehmed IV. During the reign of Sophia Alekseevna, relations between the Moscow state and the Ottoman Empire, Moscow began offensive actions against the Turkish possessions in the Crimea, while earlier its actions were defensive in nature. The reason was the accession of Russia to the Holy Alliance against the Turks, which was concluded in 1683 between the Polish king Jan Sobieski and the Austrian emperor Leopold. Venice joined this union, and Pope Innocent XI was proclaimed its patron. The allies sought to expel the Turks from Europe and

[24] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. С. 448–450.

[25] Заруба В. Н. Украинское казацкое войско в борьбе с турецко-татарской агрессией (последняя четверть XVII в.). Х.: Основа, 1993. С. 303–307.

[26] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. С. 443, 444.

[27] Заруба В. Н. Украинское казацкое войско в борьбе с турецко-татарской агрессией (последняя четверть XVII в.). Х.: Основа, 1993. С. 307.

[28] Заруба В. Похід османського війська на Чигирин влітку 1678 р. в щоденнику польського посла С. Проського. URL: http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/78661/20-Zaruba.pdf?sequence=1(дата звернення: 16.08.2020).

[29] Багалій Д. І. Історія Слобідської України. Харків : Основа, 1991. С. 48, 49.

[30] Яворницький Д. І. Історія запорізьких козаків. Львів : «Світ», 1991. Т. 2. С. 366–368.

[31] Чухліб Т.В. Бахчисарайський мир 1681 р. дата публікації: 2003 р. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=Bakhchysarajskyj_myr_1681 (дата звернення: 16.08.2020).

decided to attract other states to the union, in particular the Muscovy.

According to A. I. Rigelman's testimony, at the beginning of 1687, relations between Moscow and the Crimean Khanate were aggravated again[32]. And in May this year, the next campaign of the Moscow army to the Crimea begins. About 100 thousand army, including the Don and Zaporozhye Cossacks, under the leadership of V. V. Golitsyn approached the Crimea, but at this time the Crimean Tatars set fire to the steppe, which deprived the huge army of food for horses. As a result, on June 17, 1687, V. V. Golitsyn's army began to retreat to the territory of Ukraine, where the Cossack foreman, with the support.

V. Golitsyn, seeks from the Moscow government to eliminate hetman I. Samoilovich, who did not approve of the continuation of the war against Turkey and the Crimean Khanate. As a result, Ivan Mazepa became hetman. And in 1688 preparations began for the next campaign to the Crimea. And in February 1689 the second Crimean campaign of about 112 thousand Moscow army began. In mid-May of this year, a battle took place between this army and the Crimean Tatar army. Consequently, the Moscow army approached Perekop. However, due to an unfavorable situation for itself, it again retreated to the territory of Ukraine, and subsequently returned to Moscow. In Moscow, Princess Sophia Alekseevna wanted to present both unsuccessful campaigns as significant victories, which in reality they were not. But the unfortunate result was the result of the elimination of Princess Sophia in 1698.

Thus, the Crimean campaigns of Moscow in 1687 and 1689. They did not give the desired result in solving the main task of the Moscow state – regarding the protection of its southern borders – the Wild Field, which, to a large extent, was controlled by the Crimean Khanate.

In fact, the Wild Field for the Crimean Khanate served as an interstate buffer zone, it was a significant obstacle to the military invasion of Crimea from land through Perekop. Probably, hetman Ivan Samoilovich did not want the defeat of the Crimean Khanate, which played the role of a kind of counterbalance to Moscow's great-power interests in southern Ukraine. And this was one of the reasons for his removal from power. The next hetman, Ivan Mazepa, who was once sent by hetman P. Doroshenko at the head of a delegation to the Crimea and Turkey, in his foreign policy sought to adhere to a friendly policy with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire.

In general, the Moscow-Turkish war of 1686–1700, as a component of the Great Turkish War of 1683–1699, which ended in 1700 with the signing of the Treaty of Constantinople. This treaty ensured the neutrality of the Ottoman state and allowed Peter I (1672–1725) to enter the Northern War. In fact, this meant the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

[32] Рігельман О. І. Літописна оповідь про Малу Росію та її народ і козаків узагалі. К.: Либідь, 1994. 478.

References

Akty, otnosyashchiyesya k istorii Yuzhnoy i Zapadnoy Rossii, sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoy komissiyey : [V 15-ti t.] (dalí – AYUZR). SPb., 1861–1892. T. 13: 1677-1678. SPb. : Tip. A. M. Kotomina i K. 1884. 766 c.

Bahaliy D. I. Istoriya Slobidskoyi Ukrayiny. Kharkiv : Osnova, 1991. 256 c.

Velychko S. V. Litopys / per. z knyzhnoyi ukrayins'koyi movy; za red. O. V. Myshanycha. K. : Dnipro, 1991. T. 2. 642 s.

Gordon P. Dnevnik. 1677–1678 / red. M. R. Ryzhenkov. M. : Nauka, 2005. 236 s.

Horobets' V. Mriya, utoplena v pidozrilosti y obrazakh, abo Chomu takym korotkym bulo zhyttya ukrayins'ko-pol's'koyi uniyi 1659 roku? Viyny i myr, abo «Ukrayintsi – polyaky: braty/vorohy, susidy» / za zah. red. L. Ivshynoyi; Uporyad.: V. Horobets', V. Panchenko, YU. Shapoval. K. : ATZT Ukrayins'ka pres-hrupa, 2004. S. 94–108.

Zaruba V. N. Ukrainskoye kazatskoye voysko v bor'be s turetsko-tatarskoy agressiyey (poslednyaya chetvert' XVII v.). Xar'kov : Osnova, 1993. 168 s.

Kahanov YU. O. Istorychna komparatyvistyka kriz' pryzmu filosofs'ko-metodolohichnoho pohlyadu. Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho fakul'tetu Zaporiz'koho natsional'noho universytetu, 2010. Vyp. XXIX. S. 250–258.

Karantsevych V. L. Bytva pid Konotopom. K. : INTER PROEKT, 2012. 120 s.

Rihel'man O. I. Litopysna opovid' pro Malu Rosiyu ta yiyi narod i kozakiv uzahali. K.: Lybid', 1994. 768 s.

Litopys Samovydtsya / upor.: YA. I. Dzyra. K. : Nauk. dumka, 1971. 208 s. 80–82.

Chelebi Evliya. Kniga puteshestviya. T. 1. Zemli Moldavii i Ukrainy; per. pod red. A. S. Tveritinovoy. M. : Nauka. 1961. URL: http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus8/Celebi3/text5.phtml?id=1731 (data zvernennya: 15.08.2020).

Chukhlib T. V. Bakhchysarays'kyy myr 1681 r. data publikatsiyi: 2003 r. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=Bakhchysarajskyj_myr_1681 (data zvernennya: 16.08.2020).

Yavornyts'kyy D. I. Istoriya zaporiz'kykh kozakiv. L'viv : «Svit», 1991. T. 2. 440 s.