



Рецензії

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INTEGRATING EUROPEAN EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC AREA: THE «UKRAINIAN TALK SERIES» PROJECT

ІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ДО ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО ОСВІТНЬО-НАУКОВОГО ПРОСТОРУ: ПРОЄКТ «UKRAINIAN TALK SERIES»

Today, Ukraine is perceived by the Europeans as a part of European civilization, sharing the same values and ideals. After the full-scale Russian invasion, the European support for our country has reached unprecedented levels, including the support for educators, scientific and intellectual elites.

One of the Russian propaganda tools is the Russian concept of presenting historical facts. As a result, history is used to justify war, deny Ukraine's status as an independent state, and assign Ukrainian lands to the so-called «Russian world».

Throughout the months of full-scale war, Ukrainian universities have become educational and informational centers of the struggle, directing their efforts towards the formation of national identity, influencing citizens' self-awareness in conditions of full-scale armed aggression and information warfare, and continuing their path of integration into the European educational-scientific space. Many Ukrainian universities have established cooperation with a number of leading European higher education institutions.

Zaporizhzhia National University was not an exception and adopted a new development strategy for the period of 2023–2025 under the conditions of war and post-war recovery of Ukraine¹. One of the elements of the strategy is to prioritize internationalization taking into account the conditions of the war and to develop and implement internationalization at the level of departments, faculties, and the university. For the Faculty of History and International Relations of ZNU, one of the important

directions of such cooperation has been collaboration with the History Faculty of Durham University (Durham, UK). The Agreement on bilateral cooperation between Zaporizhzhia National University and Durham University was signed in June 2022 and became part of the overall Twinning project (71 partnership agreements between British and Ukrainian universities were signed with the support of the Universities of the United Kingdom (UKK) and the Ministry of Education of Ukraine)².

«Ukrainian Talk Series» is one of the important components of the project. Dr. Markian Prokopovych, Professor of history at Durham University was the coordinator and moderator of all the events³:

On October 13–16, 2022, the annual Durham Book Festival took place. Stanislav Cherkasov, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of History and International Relations and Associate Professor of World History and International Relations, participated in a panel discussion entitled «Ukraine: Geopolitics and History on the European Border,» which focused on the main historical and geopolitical aspects of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine and its possible consequences for the global community.

On December 8, 2022, «Medieval Ukraine's Past and Paths to Writing European History» was a key speech by Dr. Sergiy Lyakh, a professor of history. Students and graduate students from the facul-

¹ Стратегія розвитку Запорізького національного університету в умовах воєнного стану та повоєнного відновлення України на 2023–2025 роки URL: https://www.znu.edu.ua/docs/2023/_znu_2023_2025.pdf

² Durham University twinned with Zaporizhzhia University in Ukraine URL: <https://www.palatiniate.org.uk/durham-university-twinned-with-zaporizhzhia-university-in-ukraine>

³ Деколонізуєчи східноєвропейську історію: на історичному факультеті реалізували спільний онлайн-проєкт із британськими істориками. URL: <http://surl.li/feccs>; Пів року плідного співробітництва: перші підсумки україно-британського партнерства на історичному факультеті ЗНУ URL: <http://surl.li/feced>

ty participated in the event, including Yaroslava Fatyukha, student of the specialty 291 «International Relations, Social Communications, and Regional Studies.»

On February 16, 2023, the «Decolonizing Eastern European History» webinar was held as a part of the «Ukrainian Talk Series» online project program. From Zaporizhzhia National University, Dr. Halina Turchenko, a professor of history, and Dr. Fedir Turchenko, a professor of history, participated in the event.

On March 1, 2023, during the panel discussion «Ukrainian Refugees: Challenges and Opportunities,» Associate Professor Sergiy Bilivnenko proposed discussing the problems of the war in Ukraine through the prism of mass migration waves across the European continent.

All of the project's events have had broad public resonance in both the United Kingdom and Ukraine. This publication presents the key points of the scientists' speeches in general. It should be noted that the Ukrainian-British project «Ukrainian Talk Series» is not completed yet, and it has a wide range of the planned academic initiatives, with the further cooperation expected.

Stanislav Cherkasov «Ukraine: Geopolitics and History in the European Borderlands»

Ukraine has long played an important, yet sometimes overlooked, role in the global security order. Today, the country is on the front lines of a renewed great-power rivalry that many experts say will dominate international relations in the decades ahead.

Ukraine became a battleground in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas region in the country's southeast. The past three decades – and especially the years since the 2014 «Revolution of Dignity», Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas – have witnessed a significant consolidation of Ukrainian civic identity. A generation has grown up in an independent Ukraine that, for all its flaws, has maintained a true democracy and is becoming increasingly European in its outlook. If anything, the current war has further united Ukrainian citizens from all regions and linguistic and religious backgrounds while reinforcing the split between Ukrainian and Russian identities. Thus, whatever happens on the battlefield, Russia is almost certain to fail in its bid to establish lasting control over its neighbor.

The war against Ukraine proves that Europe is even more in danger than Europeans thought just a few months ago. Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine

is not only an unprovoked attack on a sovereign country standing up for its rights and its democracy, it is also the biggest challenge to Europe's security order since the end of World War II. At stake are the very principles upon which international relations are built, not least those of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

Scholars are convinced that Europe must be more than a soft power: it needs hard power too. However, it needs to realise that the concept of hard power cannot be reduced to military means: it is about using the full range of instruments to achieve vital goals. It is about thinking and acting in terms of power. And, bit by bit, the conditions for this to happen are being fulfilled.

Historians should acknowledge that in the history of European defence there have been numerous plans and initiatives, full of acronyms, going from the Pleven Plan and the European Defence Community. Yet the basic fact remains that security and defence is probably the area in European integration with the biggest gap between expectations and results. Yet, there is a growing awareness among Europeans about the threats they face together and the degree to which their fates are tied. Today, no one in Europe can believe or think that what is happening in Ukraine does not concern them, no matter how far away they are from the drama.

Crises tend to crystallise developments and this one has made it even clearer that we live in a world shaped by raw power politics, where everything is weaponised and where we face a fierce battle of narratives, battles of values and senses. Speaking in terms of political science and concepts, are we witnessing nowadays the true «Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order» predicted by Huntington who argued that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures? All these trends were already happening before the Ukraine war; now they are accelerating. In a nuclear-armed world where direct superpower conflict can have apocalyptic consequences, the proxy battlefield has become economics and finance. The Western response to Russia's invasion has relied on tools that combine its soft power – in the form of brands, companies, and markets – with more military mechanisms.

At its core, war is about power – who has it, who doesn't, and who can effectively use it. The war in Ukraine is no exception. But the outcomes over the first months of the war have surprised many observers, challenging some traditional assessments of military and economic power. Most unexpected has

been that Russia's military advantages did not allow it to accomplish its initial objectives. Instead, Ukrainian forces have held their own and even pushed the Russian military back in places. At least a part of the explanation lies in some changes in the nature and exercise of power that have emerged over the past decade.

The war in Ukraine is justified by the Kremlin with the rhetoric of the mid-19th century: wherever the Russian imperial flag has ever been raised once should remain the Russian territory forever. Poland, for instance, was also under Russian imperialism, similar colonial aspects can be identified. This contrasts accounts of the 19th-century Imperialism by Mackinder and the economist John Hobson. Mackinder and Hobson might be taken as paradigmatic ideologists at two ends of the discussion, but in many respects they shared similar concerns. Both gave University Extension lectures to develop secondary academic disciplines; for Mackinder it was geography, and for Hobson it was a style of economics that was at once historical, sociological, and institutional. The challenge is that people in Russia have experienced decades of brainwashing about the so-called «evils of the West». Many Russians don't care about politics or international relations, and they don't question the news they watch. The important point in the understanding of Russian nationalism is that the post-1991 Russian federation is a fragment of the empire rather than a nation-state. Russian political and media establishment rejects the very possibility of critically assessing the Russian cultural legacy.

This is where scholars can really help. Scholars in history, psychology, communications, conflict management and negotiations study how to influence someone who has strong incentives to maintain their beliefs. We can craft clearer, less threatening, more persuasive messages. People who are trying to break through the wall of Russian propaganda – from concerned activists to the U.S. government – would be wise to tap into this wealth of research-driven expertise.

When faced with false and dangerous beliefs, our impulse is to make the strongest, most attention-grabbing argument possible. So, offering concrete action steps, such as accessing independent news, is key to motivating action. These messages also explain in a few words how to access websites and browsers that evade government censorship and internet blocks and provide reliable information on what's really happening in the war. In this way, we combined our very different skills to reach Russians

with messages that we hope will leave them more open to hearing the truth about the war their country is waging. We hope others join us in paving this path toward peace.

A final example of the blurred line between hard and soft power has been the rise of thousands of so-called hacktivists who are engaging in an online campaign to hack Russian websites and combat Russian disinformation. These groups have been using cyber capabilities – a hard power tool – to seize Russian data and hold it hostage, to collect and release internal Russian government communications, and to break through Russia's internet blockade to communicate with its citizens. These activities have both operational goals – to undermine Russian capabilities – and goals of persuasion, to break Russian popular support for the war.

As Russia's invasion of Ukraine has stalled and its forces have invaded the battleground in the east, the war is entering a new, darker, and more dangerous phase. Ruined cities provide a preview of that future. Putin who bombed Grozny into rubble in order to «liberate» it, and who joined Syrian dictator in razing Aleppo, certainly has no moral reservations about mass destruction. Crimes against humanity are certain acts that are purposefully committed by Russia, or on behalf of Russia, as part of a widespread or systematic policy, typically directed against civilians. Moreover, the war in Ukraine is now unambiguously Putin's war, and the Russian leader knows that he cannot lose – without risking his regime and even his life.

Some scholars argue that the world has re-entered a cold-war period, dominated by bipolarity and competition between autocracy and democracy. But the greater diversity of actors exercising power, the more extensive interdependence, and the proliferation of tools that combine hard and soft power suggest otherwise. Instead, the world seems to be moving to an environment that is hypercompetitive but in which power is more diffuse, dynamic, and cross-cutting than was the case during the Cold War. This may lead to increasing international instability and conflict, and it certainly creates an array of new challenges for states. But it also creates new opportunities, especially for smaller states pushing back on larger ones and for non-state actors seeking influence. To achieve the upper hand, policymakers will need to account for and coordinate the many non-state actors.

Scholars and policy makers need to stop watching the war in Ukraine like a football match and placing bets on who will win. This is a war for the survival of Europe, battle for the values of European civiliza-

tion, human rights and European culture of human dignity. Who will become the next victim of Russian aggression if Ukraine falls? Europeans may have no second chance to support Ukraine.

On February 24, 2022, Russia forever changed the way we perceive politics and military operations in mainland Europe by launching an invasion of Ukraine. An invasion that made millions of Ukrainians seek refuge in Western countries evolved into the most terrifying political, financial, and humanitarian crisis in modern history. But the determined resistance of the Ukrainian people to Russian aggression has shown the folly of Putin's vision of reality. Despite Russia's superior military might, the Ukrainian people have made a stand for their sovereignty and their freedom. Stand with Ukraine!

Sergiy Lyakh «Medieval Ukraine's Past and Paths to Writing European History»

The academic environment in Ukraine has been in a state of intensive rethinking for about 35 years, both in terms of its history as a whole and the medieval period in particular.

We have seen significant changes in the study of the period between the Polish-Hungarian Union of 1370 and the Union of Lublin of 1569. I would say that this period was a turning point in the history of Ukraine. Within Soviet historiography, this period of Ukrainian history remained largely in the shadows. Only one process was more or less actively studied at the time, namely the spread of serfdom and the enslavement of peasants.

And at the end of the 1980s, the first fundamental turning point occurred. We stopped trying to fit the global historical process into the rigid borders of the USSR. As a result, the general rule and even the rallying cry became: to consider and present the history of Ukraine in a pan-European context.

But during the 1990s, this European context was understood mainly mechanically, geographically, and superficially:

For example, we dare to call Daniel of Galicia a king, as the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle of the 13th century does. (But in the Soviet tradition, there could only be one tsar; all others were ranked no higher than a prince).

We realize that the Golden Horde was opposed not only by Kiev but also by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania.

We dare to recognize the high level of education in Catholic gymnasiums and acknowledge the fact that Ukrainian nobility and Cossack elders gladly

sent their sons there to study. We rediscovered the fact that Ukrainians studied at almost all universities in Europe.

We have rediscovered the fact that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky had intense diplomatic relations not only with the Russian tsar but also with Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV, Swedish King Charles X, and Transylvanian Prince George II Rakoczy. But, I repeat, this was more of a symbolic than a substantive turning point.

Thanks to the research of a new generation of historians, a new slogan has emerged: it turns out that today Ukraine is not moving towards Europe, it is returning to Europe.

Galyna Turchenko «Modern Russian Historical Myths as a Justification of the Russian Federation's War against Ukraine».

In the contemporary war of Russia against Ukraine, history has transformed into weapons. Modern Russian historical myths justify Russia's war against Ukraine. Namely, the main mythmaker is Putin himself. In the summer of 2021, he delivered a speech on his article «About historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians». In that article, he suggested historical myths regarding Ukrainians, which called for justification for the aggression against Ukraine. Those myths were picked up by Russian propaganda. Anti-Ukrainian narratives have been heard from Pieskov, Zhyrynovsky, politicians, cultural and sports representatives, etc. Those myths prevail in Russian schools, universities, and schools of the occupied Ukrainian territories, as well as Crimea. These historical myths are meant to create an illusion of justice regarding this war among Russians and the world public, to persuade Ukrainians that their state is artificial and requires external (Russian) governance.

Propagation of anti-Ukrainian imperial myths started far earlier. They constituted a hybrid war between Russia against Ukraine. Under conditions of the Orange Revolution in 2004, a pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko won the presidential elections. Putin understood that he was losing Ukraine. Attempts to return Ukraine to the Russian orbit intensified under the presidency of Yanukovich. During that period, the project regarding a joint textbook on history for school students of Russia and Ukraine emerged. In that textbook history of Ukraine would have been represented in the all-Russian context. Its objective was to create an illusion of a joint past and future for Ukraine and Russia.

Let us identify the prominent Russian imperial myths: 1) Ukrainians and Russians are the same people, and the Ukrainian language is the Russian language with a mixture of other languages. 2) Russia is a successor of Kyivan Rus. 3) Myth about 'Novorosiia'. Non-recognition of Southern Ukraine from the point of view of Ukrainian character. A statement that the South of Ukraine is settled with non-Ukrainians. That this is Russian territory. 4) Ukraine was created by Lenin, in other words, Soviet power. 5) Illegal separation of Ukraine from the USSR. 6) Current power in Ukraine is Nazis (fascists), and the objective of the war (military operation) is to destroy Nazis and free the Ukrainian brothers from their oppression.

Couple of words about one of these myths, which we, historians of Zaporizhzhia National University, managed to disclaim. It is a myth about Novorosiia. It was created in 1764, when Russian tsarina Ekaterina II decided to establish a new administrative unit – Novorosiia Governorate – on the freshly conquered territories of the South. The Governorate was expected to have become a place of arms for tactical mission preparation to capture Istanbul and transform it into Constantinople. That plan was a failure. However, it has never been forgotten within Russian imperial circles. In 2014, Vladimir Putin used the definition 'Novorosiia' in one of his interviews. He defined Southern Ukrainian oblasts as Novorosiia, which Caterina II used to join the Russian empire. According to Putin, those who live there are «our people», hence, Russians.

In 2014, there was an attempt to establish the independence of quasi-republic Novorosiia granted by Moscow. However, this attempt did not have any success. The project «Novorosiia» was not supported by the citizens in the region. There are objective reasons. According to the census of Southern Ukrainian Governorates carried out in 19–20th centuries, Ukrainian populations exceeded Russian in this region. Historians have not recorded proof of the Novorossian language, Novorossian songs, or Novorossian fairy tales. Instead of Novorosiia, it was a Ukrainian region formed here with a predominantly Ukrainian population.

To dispel the imperial myth about Novorosiia, my co-author professor Fedir Turchenko and I addressed it in 2014. In our book «Project Novorosiia. Jubilee on the blood», which we published, in detail, we described the genesis and evolution of this myth. The book has had four editions.

Nowadays, historians in Ukraine and worldwide are working on dispelling Russian imperial myths.

It is our historical battlefield with Russian aggression. The truth is with us, and we will win. Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Great Britain!

Fedir Turchenko «Modern Russian Historical Myths as a Justification of the Russian Federation's War against Ukraine»

Today, Ukraine is at war with Russia. So, I will connect my short presentation about the decolonisation of Eastern European history with the reasons for this war and its consequences, which it is leading. But first, I would like to swim with the kind words of our President, Volodymyr Zelensky, recently addressed to the people of Great Britain, King Charles III, your parliament and prime minister Rishi Sunak.

Once again, the modern Russo-Ukrainian war has a hybrid character. The enemy aims at inflicting our people false apprehension about our past and present, paralysing our will to resist. Therefore, history and its comprehension have significant importance in this war. In this talk, I would like briefly to focus on two key problems:

First, our historians explain Russia's attack with features of its historical path. Ukrainian researchers determine three stages of Russia's history, each of which is distinguished by a new character of expansionist:

The first stage: was the Tsardom of Moscovia, when the idea of Orthodox messianism called «Moscow is the Third Rome (after Rome in Italy, Constantinople in Byzantine). And the fourth will not happen» was in the core of foreign policy. At that time, in the 17th century, Ukraine fell into dependence on Moscovia and, in fact, became its colony.

The second stage: was the Russian Empire with an intention to unite all Slavic people (Pan-Slavism). Integration of Ukraine into the imperial system took place.

Third stage: the Soviet Union and its concept of worldwide communist revolution.

Nowadays, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, Putin's Russia is going through a period of «phantom pain», which reveal in the form of attempts to restore control over lost territories. It is the fourth stage of the Russian imperial concept, which can be proved with an expansionist theory of the «Multinational Russian world/Rusky mir». Ukraine is the first in its fulfilment. The situation occupied by Russian territories is proof of it.

And if Russia isn't stopped, it won't be stopped in Ukraine either. The next will be those states which used to comprise the USSR and the so-called «Socialist camp».

What are Ukrainian historians doing in these circumstances?

They have established «HISTORICAL FRONT» – an informal association of researchers who dispel Russian imperial myths and fakes, as well as restore non-ascertained aspects of Russian-Ukrainian relations. It is what a decolonisation of our historiography is, which used to be under the influence of the Russian one.

Another important field of research for our historians in wartime is the elimination of imperial colonial footprints on the maps and in the people's historical memory. It is another essential aspect in terms of decolonising Ukraine.

Ukraine appertained to Moscow for 350 years. That process was accompanied by colonial oppression: economic exploitation, total russification, abolishment of Ukrainian schools (in a 1-million citizens city Zaporizhzhia there was only one Ukrainian school in 1991), glorification of anti-Ukrainian figures, on the honour of which Soviet authorities installed monuments, renamed cities, towns, villages, educational institutions, etc. On the whole, Ukraine was deprived of its historiography. National heroes of Ukraine were considered enemies. Museums, archives and libraries were full of false resources and exhibitions.

After the Revolution of Dignity in 2015, the process of decommunization started, which transformed into derussification in all spheres of life after the full-scale invasion. Our historians are in the epicentre of this process. They are returning history to its people. We are doing what the peoples of Eastern Europe did right after the fall of the «Berlin wall».

In the current circumstances of the Russo-Ukrainian war, we are studying the experience of other states and people who stood up for their independence in similar conditions. In Ukraine, we often recall your former prime minister Winston Churchill who, during the time of the Second World War, on the suggestion to cut the budget for cultural development, responded: «What are we fighting for?»

Generally, the topic of British history often resounds in Ukrainian media. Ukrainians admire how heroic British people were at the beginning of the Second World War when face-to-face fighting successfully against Nazi Germany. We believe that by remembering those years, British people are helping us in the fight against Russian aggression. Glory to Great Britain! Glory to Ukraine!

S. Bilivnenko The Problem of Refugees Fleeing the Russian-Ukrainian War: the Zaporizhzhia Aspect

Introduction

On February 24, 2023, a round table dedicated to the anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion to Ukraine «The Year of Struggle. Zaporizhzhia region» was held in Zaporizhzhia Museum of Local History. One of the participants, who moved to Zaporizhzhia from the region, said during the discussion the phrase: «We really want to become citizens of Zaporizhzhia, take part in the life of the community, integrate with the Zaporizhzhia community.» The locals said that you are already ours, you are the same as we, you are part of the community. But is it so? Do the residents of Zaporizhzhia perceive the refugees as their own, or are the refugees themselves going to connect their lives with Zaporizhzhia.

Context

Displaced persons did not appear in Zaporizhzhia in 2022. The refugees from the Donetsk region have appeared in the city since 2014. Residents of the occupied by the Russians territories (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) and the battle zone in the eastern territories of Ukraine settled in Zaporizhzhia during the war. The majority moved to Zaporizhzhia at their own risk. Most of them rented apartments, looked for work, engaged with the social life of the community. Some of them used state temporary resettlement programs, for example, they lived in a modular town for displaced persons in the Commnarsky district of the city. The townspeople treated the settlers in different ways: they mainly helped relatives and acquaintances, some did not notice the forced migrants at all. Someone was neutral, someone sympathized, there were also hostile attitudes. In this case people accused the refugees of not being able to integrate, and blamed them for the deterioration of the situation in the country and in Zaporizhzhia in particular. At the same time, non-governmental organizations and volunteers appeared in the city who helped the displaced persons to settle down and integrate into a new way of life.

The Great War

In the morning of February 24, hundreds of cars from the Azov region were coming to Zaporizhzhia. Russian troops, overcoming the resistance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, gradually occupied the Kherson and the Zaporizhzhia regions. There was a confusion at the gas stations already in the morning in Zaporizhzhia – queues of several kilometers formed at the stations. In the afternoon, restrictions on the sale of gas were introduced. Some of the local residents, fearing the capture of the city,

packed their belongings and left the city in the direction of central and western Ukraine. Panic was also observed in supermarkets, markets, and banks. In the afternoon, the ATMs were empty. In the evening, a curfew was introduced in Zaporizhzhia. Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian railways) urgently appointed evacuation trains – but there were not enough seats for everyone. Mothers with small children slept in the corridors and even vestibules of the train, which were operated in complete darkness. Turning on the light was considered a violation of light masking and a danger to passengers.

At the same time, the mobilization of men began. A large number of men decided to go to the military institutions voluntarily. A day later the troops of the Russian Federation reached the southern entrance to Melitopol, the largest city in the region after Zaporizhzhia. The next day, battles continued in the city, and our soldiers gradually left the south of the region, many were captured and died in the battles. The front line stabilized only at the beginning of March, but by that time Russians captured not only Melitopol, but also Berdiansk, Tokmak, Enerгодар, besides Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Station, Pology and Vasylivka. The Russians came close to Orihiv and Guliaipole. Tens of thousands of residents left their homes and became refugees. Pro-Ukrainian citizens left the keys to their houses and apartments to relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances and drove the cars to Zaporizhzhia, which became a transit city. The majority of the first wave of displaced persons moved further to the west, no one perceived Zaporizhzhia as a safe place. At the cost of incredible efforts, the Ukrainian Army stopped the enemy at a distance of 40–50 km from Zaporizhzhia. About 70% of the territory of the Zaporizhzhia region was occupied.

People

If the first wave consisted of highly mobile families who had their own transport, certain means of livelihood, were able to take care of their family or themselves, the majority of those who remained under the occupation or in the zone of active hostilities were burdened by certain conditions. Such conditions could be: relatives with limited mobility, household, state of health, lack of transport etc. But there was also a reverse process. People mistakenly believed that small settlements could not become objects of active hostilities, missile attacks and bombings. Therefore, people from Zaporizhzhia and other large cities went to their relatives in villages or small towns, hoping to wait out the active phase of hostilities there. Expectations were different:

from waiting for the winner in order to adapt to the political situation further, to confidence in the victory of the Ukrainian Army and a return to a stable «pre-war» life. Then many of these people were trapped in the occupied territory, where the lack of normal conditions for living, such as electricity, gas, water, due to the damage of the infrastructure was.

And then there was Mariupol. The city, which was connected to the Zaporizhzhia region after the occupation of Donetsk and the surrounding areas in 2014, was actually under blockade since March 3, 2022. The constant shelling of the city by the Russians, which caused mass casualties of the civilian population, turned Mariupol into a death trap. The first Mariupol refugees arrived in Zaporizhzhia by their own cars in the evening of March 14. Then this flow continued with interruptions until the complete capture of Mariupol by the Russians and the capitulation of the «Azovstal garrison». Residents of villages, towns, and Zaporizhzhia remember the huge number of Mariupol citizens, who reached their settlements on bullet-riddled cars with the inscription «Children» or by foot. After several hours, days or weeks, these people were moving further to the west, far away from the contact line and the occupiers. They also mention the ambiguity of the position of displaced persons, who claimed that the Ukrainian army only deteriorated the situation with its resistance, and the most acceptable option was to accept the occupation and integrate into the Russian state. Today, it is difficult to establish the percentage of supporters of such opinions and the influence of events at the front and living conditions under the occupation/on the contact line/in the rear on the formation of the idea of capitulation. Most of the Zaporizhzhia residents, who were not involved in direct work with refugees, remember them as silent, with indescribable sadness in their eyes, or remember just some aspects of clothing of the newcomers. Donetsk region residents left Zaporizhzhia quite quickly. Mutilated cars disappeared within a few weeks. But some of them who didn't have the transportation or money to rent apartments in the west of the country or abroad settled in Zaporizhzhia. Then the departure from the zone of active hostilities and occupied territories began. If the reason for people from the battle zone was most often a direct threat to life, then there were various reasons for people from the occupied territories: from repression or the threat of repression by the occupiers, to the desire for a normal life in a peaceful territory, with further possibility of return or arrangement elsewhere.

Authority. Social Workers and Volunteers

At first, various social services such as the State Emergency Service, the National Police, the Departments of Social Protection, other relevant state institutions and local self-governments took care of the displaced persons. Buildings, food and hygiene products were provided for priority needs. But a human resource was needed. In this case both traditional charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross, and volunteer organizations, which were based either on some institutions like Zaporizhzhia National University, or charismatic individuals who created independent centers to help military and civilians in need like Palianytsia, Beluga UA and others, worked best. We should also mention the organizations affiliated to various religious organizations of different denominations, for instance Caritas Zaporizhzhia).

Socialization and Difficult Choice

After the shock of passing through the phase of active hostilities, surviving under shelling, hiding in ill-equipped basements, storage rooms, cellars, after losing property, or worse, family members and friends, the displaced people found themselves in safe conditions (of course, we remember the constant missile attacks in Zaporizhzhia and all communities around). The question of everyday life arrangement arose. And a lot of problems naturally arose. Most of the displaced people settled in temporary shelters based on schools, dormitories, and kindergartens. People who found themselves in new conditions of survival, and not a peaceful life, had to adapt and «accept the rules of the game.» For the elderly, their own helplessness and, in their opinion, uselessness also came as a shock, many felt like a burden to their relatives. For almost all generations, the problem of housing has become topical. If the refugees were settled in the houses of their relatives or acquaintances, then in a few months, or even weeks, uncomfortable and conflict situations arose. Forced unemployment among refugees was also important. If it was not possible to find a job, many active able-bodied people joined the volunteer movement. This solved the problem of employment for a certain period, but later led to emotional exhaustion. Elderly displaced persons suffered from chronic diseases that limited their mobility and, unfortunately, often became the cause of premature death. Therefore, the reactions

of forced settlers to all these challenges were different. Some adapted, looked for work, received help from charitable and public organizations, looked for separate housing, some went abroad, then returned, then after the October and September mass shelling of Zaporizhzhia and the surrounding area, they left the city again. Some have put up with their status and live in shelters, receiving assistance to maintain their livelihoods. And some came back, either to the occupied territory, or to the zone of active hostilities. The occasions that led to such actions are different, but the reason is almost always the same – the lack of prospects for a normal life in the status of an internally displaced person. A lot of people returned to their own homes, since in our cultural paradigm house is the basis of existence, the loss of which is equivalent to the loss of life. In the rural areas under the occupation, the property and the household, which were left without care, were subject to destruction and decay. Therefore, most of those who returned belong to the age category over forty years old, who have their own house and are confident that they will be able to support themselves in the occupied territory, either through individual farming or minimal payments from the Ukrainian state and the occupiers.

Conclusion

The problem of displaced persons in the Zaporizhzhia region is determined by several factors such as quick occupation of 70 % of the region, constant active hostilities on the front line, the «Mariupol direction», the desire of the occupiers for the shameful legalization of their actions due to the illegal decision to include the Zaporizhzhia region to the Russian Federation. Studying the arguments of those who have returned, we can define family and household features (caring for less mobile family members, taking care of the house etc), or the inability to adapt to life in new conditions, the lack of psycho-emotional comfort in the status of an internally displaced person and prospects for the normalization of further life. All these problems and issues can be solved only by the de-occupation of the territory of Ukraine and the introduction of rehabilitation programs for all categories of the population.

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