

ШТУЧНЕ ПРОТИСТАВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНЦІВ СХОДУ Й ЗАХОДУ В ПЕРІОД НЕЗАЛЕЖНОСТІ УКРАЇНИ НА ПРИКЛАДІ ДОНЕЧЧИНИ

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У статті зроблена спроба висвітлити штучне протиставлення українців Сходу й Заходу впродовж періоду незалежної України на прикладі Донецчини. Зауважено, що впродовж останніх десятиліть спостерігалися різного роду спроби штучно протиставити населення Заходу й Сходу. Зазначено, що активним знаряддям цих дій були всілякі проросійські політичні угруповання. Наголошено, що політика протиставлення українців Заходу й Сходу поєднувалася з цілеспрямованим нищенням національної ідентичності українців Донецчини. Підсумовано, що саме такі дії, великою мірою, й призвели до окупації частини території України 2014-го р. та до розв'язання Кремлем проти України гібридно-інформаційної війни.

ARTIFICIAL OPPOSITION OF UKRAINIANS OF EAST AND WEST IN THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE ON THE EXAMPLE OF DONETSK REGION

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Key words: national identity, language, Ukrainian, Donechchina, history, Ukraine, Russia, Radian's empire.

The article attempts to highlight the artificial opposition of the Ukrainian East and West in the period of independent Ukraine on the example of the Donetsk region. It has been noticed that during the last decades there have been observed various kinds of attempts to artificially counterpose the population of the West and the East, primarily in the linguistic sense. It was emphasized that the idea of the split of the "two Ukrainians" was cordially picked up by a part of the Ukrainian political, moreover, it was rather ingeniously exploited by him long before she acquired a bright publicistic form. It is noted that all sorts of pro-Russian political groups were an active tool for these actions. And as a result – the events of 2014 were a difficult exam for the Ukrainian state and society, while simultaneously opening a new page in national history. Behind the scenes of political, diplomatic, military confrontation around the territorial integrity and the preservation of a single civil space of Ukraine, the struggle of ideas unfolded, which revealed deep-seated mentality of the population and local elites. Consequently, from the end of February 2014, the active phase of the deployment of separatist movements in the east and south of Ukraine was launched. At the same time, Russia and pro-Russian forces, in order to push the local population towards political mobilization in their own interests, appealed to the following historical and historical constructions: "South-East", "Novorossiya", "Donbass", "Donetsk People's Republic" (DPR), "Lugansk People's Republic" Republic" (LC). It is indicated that the so-called "South-East" is an artificial construction of the media and political science space known to the population through the mass media, but not rooted in its consciousness. It is noted that the policy of opposing the Ukrainian West and East was combined with the purposeful destruction of the Ukrainian identity of the Donetsk region. It was summed up that it was precisely such actions that largely led to the occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine in 2014 and the decisions of the Kremlin against Ukraine of a hybrid information war.

Problem statement. The problem of artificially opposing Ukrainians in the East and West of the country arose long before Ukraine gained independence. However, since the 1990s, and especially since the days of the Orange Revolution, it has received a rather sharp political connotation. At the heart of which, nevertheless,

lay a number of unresolved issues of a historical nature – in particular, related to linguistic identity and national identity of Ukrainians of the Donetsk region.

The analysis of sources and recent researches. The solution to this topic is described in a certain

way in the works of V. Vasilenko¹, V. Golovko², Yu. Kaganova³, G. Kalinicheva⁴, M. Ryabchuk⁵, O. Sytnyk⁶, G. Turchenko⁷, F. Turchenka and G. Turchenko⁸, T. Shamaida⁹, L. Yakubova¹⁰ and others. However, a special study on this topic in modern historiography is absent.

The publication's purpose. The article is devoted to the practice of artificially opposing the Ukrainians of the East and West of the country, with the purposeful destruction of the national identity of the Ukrainian Donetsk region. The main task of the article is to characterize the artificial opposition of Ukrainians from East and West during the period of independence of Ukraine on the example of the Donetsk region as one of the prerequisites for the occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine in 2014.

Statement of the basic material. G. F. Turchenko drew attention to the fact that from the very beginning of the existence of

independent Ukraine, from the beginning of the 1990s, there were attempts at speculation on the characteristics of different regions of Ukraine. In contrast to the East and West of Ukraine, in 2004, the election campaign of the candidate for President of Ukraine from the then government was built. As you know, the large-scale falsification of election results provoked massive protests that grew into the "orange revolution". Separatism was again used as a means of combating the popular movement. At the so-called "Congress of Councils of All Levels" in Severodonetsk, leaders of those regions of the South-East, where large-scale falsifications of citizens' votes: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lugansk and Zaporizhzhya regions took place, called for the creation of the Southeast Ukrainian Autonomous Republic. Already in 2014, the political project "Novorossiya" was again adopted¹¹. It is worth noting that any differences or specific features of the population of Donbass from the rest of the Ukrainians were often used by individual Donetsk politicians to artificially create a separate "Donbass nationality" or an imaginary "people of Donbass".

The problem of national identity in Ukraine has its own specifics, determined by a long period of lack of statehood and cultural assimilation of the Ukrainian population during the stay of the territories of modern Ukraine under the control of various empires and state entities. Modern Ukraine is a transitional society with an uncertain system of basic values, the existence of which is realized in the context of situational socio-economic and socio-cultural landmarks¹². M. Ryabchuk noted that between the "two Ukraine", as between two geographical, political and cultural poles lies a huge space inhabited by a population with a rather amorphous political and national consciousness. "Ukrainian" Ukraine (and the corresponding "pro-European" values) is supported by almost a quarter of the population. "Soviet" Ukraine (with the corresponding values and orientations) is supported by about a third of respondents. The rest, and this is almost half the population, answers most of the questions stereotypically: "I don't know", "I don't understand", "I don't care", "Not yet decided"¹³. The metaphor of "two Ukraines" was gleefully

¹ Василенко В. Війна 2014 року: спроба системного аналізу. Український тиждень. № 42. Спецвипуск. 2014. С. 27–42.

² Головко В. Український розлом «руського мира»: донецька та дніпропетровська ідентичності. Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 100–122.

³ Каганов Ю. О. Конструювання «радянської людини» (1953–1991): українська версія. Запоріжжя: Інтер-М, 2019. 432 с.; Каганов Ю. О. Теоретичні підходи і концептуалізація феномену «радянської людини». Zaporizhzhia Historical Review. No. 53. Vol. 1. С. 177–186.

⁴ Калінічева Г. І. Криза національної ідентичності у контексті процесів українського націєтворення. По той бік Дніпра: вплив контраверсійних образів «іншого українця» на формування ментальних кордонів: науковий збірник / за заг. ред. д.і.н., проф. М. О. Фролова. Запоріжжя, Інтер-М, 2015. С. 102–108.

⁵ Рябчук М. Дві України. Критика. 2001. № 10. URL: www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/.../arhiv/ryabchuk

⁶ Ситник О. М. Історичні витоки російсько-української війни 2014–2017 років. Східноєвропейський історичний вісник / [головний редактор В. Ільницький]. Дрогобич: Посвіт, 2017. Вип. 2. С. 71–81.; Ситник О. Війна за незалежність 2014 – 2015 років та проблема державної ідеології в Україні. Бандерівські читання. Матеріали перших та других Бандерівських читань / упоряд. Т. Бойко, Ю. Сиротюк. К.-Івано-Франківськ: Місто НВ, 2015. С. 135–139.

⁷ Турченко Г. Імперський проект «Новоросія»: історія і сьогодення. Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 206–232.

⁸ Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. 166 с.

⁹ Шамайда Т. Рух на Схід. Підтримка українських партій на Сході і Півдні повільно, але неухильно зростає. URL: <http://textu.org.ua/pg/article/editorial/read>

¹⁰ Якубова Л. Жупел «двох Україн»: політичний міф чи об'єктивна етносоціальна реальність? Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 286–304.

¹¹ Турченко Г. Імперський проект «Новоросія»: історія і сьогодення. Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 207.

¹² Калінічева Г. І. Криза національної ідентичності у контексті процесів українського націєтворення. По той бік Дніпра: вплив контраверсійних образів «іншого українця» на формування ментальних кордонів: науковий збірник / за заг. ред. д.і.н., проф. М. О. Фролова. Запоріжжя, Інтер-М, 2015. С. 105.

¹³ Рябчук М. Дві України. Критика. 2001. № 10. URL: www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/.../arhiv/ryabchuk

picked up by the Ukrainian political elite, moreover, very clever, they exploited. The internal duality of the public of the existence of Ukraine expertly focused in every presidential and parliamentary election. If voters in the West and Center in most are aware of themselves as Ukrainians and core values consider the statehood of Ukraine, its sovereignty, voters in the East and South motivation a few others. This second part contains those who are in a concentrated mass does not accept Ukrainian statehood (the Crimea, in a way – Odessa), and those are still not out of the "Soviet period" (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv region). The West and Center called "Ukrainian Ukraine" for years to vote on the basis of philosophical, ideological motivations. Figuratively – "for Ukraine, for its destiny, for honor, for glory, for the people". The other part is called "anti-Ukraine" (the Crimea, Odessa, East), in the same years vote based on philosophical, ideological motivations. But Pro-Ukrainian. Regarding the East, especially Donetsk and Lugansk regions, this "post-Soviet Ukraine" is constantly voted solely on the basis of socio-economic motivov. Two Ukraine – two civilizational areas – the West and the East, in other words, Europe – Asia; these are two identity – traditional Ukrainian and little Russian-Imperial-Soviet. This is a different value orientations, vision for the future of Ukraine, as of such fundamental issues as democracy and authoritarianism¹. Imposing a neglect on the rest of the country and the "higher race" complex has long been the alpha and omega of the so-called "Donetsk patriotism". Local customs and traditions have received the status of ideal and binding for the whole of Ukraine. Moreover, stereotypical ideas about the "superiority" of the Donbass persistently implemented and are now driven into the heads of the inhabitants of these areas. They were constantly prompted with something like: "You are the best, and no Galicians, Naddnipyrians, Podolians, Kievans can compare with you"².

The tragic events of 2014 were a difficult test for the Ukrainian state and society, while opening a new page in Russian history. Behind the scenes of political, diplomatic, military confrontation around territorial integrity and the preservation of a unified civil space in Ukraine, a struggle of ideas unfolded, which showed the deep-seated attitudes of the population and local elites more clearly than field studies by sociologists. Since

the end of February 2014, the active phase of the deployment of separatist movements in the east and south of Ukraine has been launched. At the same time, the Russian Federation and pro-Russian forces, in order to push the local population to political mobilization in their interests, appealed to such historical and territorial structures: "South-East", "Novorossiya", "Donbass", "Donetsk People's Republic" (DPR), "Lugansk People's Republic" (LPR)³.

T. Shamaida is rightly respecting, so the title of "Pivdenny Skhid" is the whole design of the media and the political space, the population of the city through the vast mass of information, but it is not rooted in it. Mechanism – a form of engagement with electoral trends. During the sale of the new political history of viori, in front of the presidency, we showed a sympathy of vibrators in two segments. Pivdenny and shidni regioni voted for the presidential candidate, having posed himself as a politician, the clerk of Russia's movement and the eclipse of the abdication of the Russian Federation (L. Kuchma, 1994 and 1999, born in 2004, V. Yanukovych, 2004 pp.). More often than water, the frequency of redistribution was filled up with cultural and historical views, political technology played its role here, as did the candidate's senior staffs. Prinaymnni, viori sternum 1991 and 2014 pp. showed scho cultural and historical vidminnosti giperbolizovini. For example, the first viori (parliamentary 1990 and the presidential 1991 p.). Closed the warehouse – "between a democratic village and a collegiate village and a national sunset and Russification"⁴. At the same time, this artificial, political construction for a long time, purposefully in every possible way supported and financed by the Russian Federation.

Events 2014 – 2019 became a difficult test for the Ukrainian nation and state, opening at the same time a new page in our history. Behind the scenes of the political, military, diplomatic struggle for territorial integrity and the preservation of a unified civil space of Ukraine, a confrontation of ideas unfolded, which revealed a number of problems in the field of history, culture, language, which for many decades remained unresolved, or in general were artificially deformed by the Soviet ideologists (heads of state security bodies), for the further formation of ethnic conflicts and to counteract the process of national revival in znyh republics. Despite

¹ Якубова Л. Жупел «двох Україн»: політичний міф чи об'єктивна етносоціальна реальність? Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т. 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К. : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 290, 291.

² «У нас на Донбасі опозиції немає». Український тиждень. 2013. № 22. URL: <https://tyzhden.ua/Magazine/290>

³ Головки В. Український розлом «русского мира»: донецька та дніпропетровська ідентичності. Схід і Південь України: час, простір, соціум: у 2 т. Т. 1. Колективна монографія / відп. ред. В. А. Смолій; керівник авт. колективу Я. В. Верменич. К. : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2014. С. 100, 101.

⁴ Шамайда Т. Рух на Схід. Підтримка українських партій на Сході і Півдні повільно, але неухильно зростає. URL: <http://texty.org.ua/pg/article/editorial/read>

hybrid aggression by the Russian Federation, certain grounds for the occupation were laid long before that, primarily because of the destruction of the identity of Ukrainians and the humiliation of their culture and language. And it was far from accidental that the cities and workers' settlements were found to be occupied, where the Ukrainian identity was practically not preserved or was minimized. In those territories of Donetsk and Lugansk (mainly rural areas), where the Ukrainian language and self-identity were preserved to a somewhat greater extent, attempts by pro-Russian fighters-saboteurs to seize state and law enforcement agencies ended in their failure.

According to the testimony of the interrogation of the captain of the GRU of the General Staff of Russia G. Bannykh, who was exiled to Ukraine to check and prepare combat groups, only Lugansk and Donetsk were "ready", and therefore they "needed at least two to three weeks" to "raise the south-east". At the same time, special emphasis was placed on the use of a denationalized and declassified lumpen, criminals, which has always been in the practice of the Bolsheviks and remains almost the main means of the Moscow authorities in the systematic manifestations of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and other neighboring countries¹. And among this zombie population, peculiar brands of "hated Bandera" and "evil Ukrainians" were actively exaggerated. And the Moscow media only incited a hysteria of the "intransigence" of the "people of Donbass" with the "Kiev junta».

V. Vasilenko believes that the revival of Ukraine's independence is inevitably associated with the restoration of its national memory and national history and, accordingly, makes the history of Russia truncated, destroys the myth of its millennial statehood. Therefore, Russian imperial chauvinists understand that without the return of Ukraine (with its territory, resources and human potential) to Russia, any attempts to restore its imperial status are futile². Consequently, Russian ideologists and politicians are trying in every possible way to prove that: Russians and Ukrainians are one people, their reunification in one state should end with the formation of a powerful ethnos and the formation of the "Russian world" with one church, language and culture. The origins of this policy go back to the times of the Soviet era with it, in the words of Y. Kaganov, erosion of national and religious identity, the destruction of the values of self-

expression and individualism³. What was completely in the spirit of totalitarianism was to form a "new Soviet man" who was both a victim and a product of the communist regime, with the complete transformation of the population into a politically zombie mass⁴. However, these trends aimed at the destruction of independent Ukraine, including due to the artificial opposition of Ukrainians from East and West, reached their apogee at the stage of fomenting the current hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war.

According to F. Turchenko and G. Turchenko, the current Russian-Ukrainian war belongs to this type of armed conflict, which is called "hybrid", "non-linear", "non-conventional". In the course of wars of this type, various methods of fighting the enemy are used. In general terms, the characteristic features of hybrid wars are as follows: aggression without an official declaration of war; concealment by the aggressor country of its participation in the conflict; "Information war" – propaganda and counter-propaganda using "dirty" information technologies; the widespread use of the "fifth column" and irregular armed groups (in particular, under the guise of civilians), etc.⁵. The modern occupation policy of Moscow and outright aggression against Ukraine have determined a decisive stage in the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state and have generated a number of problems. One of them has an ideological character: the elimination of the remnants of Sovietism and totalitarian symbols. The current Russian-Ukrainian war, as a kind of hybrid – information-sabotage war is primarily a war of ideologies. In many respects, it was caused by the desire to reanimate the prototype of the Soviet Union by the Putin regime, with all its ideological and political attributes and symbols (including a marginal ideology, post-Soviet anthem, etc.). Many did not expect this war, but what does Putin's long-standing and annoying appeal to the ideological dogmas of the USSR cost? At the same time, in modern Russia – this country of absurdity, there are attempts to combine obviously incompatible and contradictory things (communism and "spiritual bonds", Russian nationalism with Putin's reliance on Chechens Kadyrov, etc.)⁶. And for the artificial

¹ Ситник О. М. Історичні витоки російсько-української війни 2014–2017 років. Східноєвропейський історичний вісник / [головний редактор В. Ільницький]. Дрогобич : Північ, 2017. Вип. 2. С. 79.

² Василенко В. Війна 2014 року: спроба системного аналізу. Український тиждень. № 42. Спецвипуск. 2014. С. 28, 29.

³ Каганов Ю. О. Конструювання «радянської людини» (1953–1991): українська версія. Запоріжжя: Інтер-М, 2019. С. 346.

⁴ Каганов Ю. О. Теоретичні підходи і концептуалізація феномену «радянської людини». Zaporizhzhia Historical Review. No. 53. Vol. 1. С. 178.

⁵ Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. К. : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 143.

⁶ Ситник О. Війна за незалежність 2014 – 2015 років та проблема державної ідеології в Україні. Бандерівські читання. Матеріали перших та других Бандерівських читань / упоряд. Т. Бойко, Ю. Сиротюк. К.-Івано-Франківськ : Місто НВ, 2015. С. 136–138.

split of Ukraine, Kremlin leaders do not shun any means, especially information zombies of the population of the East of Ukraine.

Conclusions. So, over the past decades, the population of Western and Eastern Ukraine, pro-Russian political groups have tried to artificially contrast, primarily in linguistic terms. The artificial use of the "Russian world" has become one of the most effective means of contrasting the Ukrainian East and West. And the industrial cities of the Donetsk region, with a denationalized population, became a kind of epicenter of this process. At the same time, the policy of opposing the Ukrainians of the West and the East of the country was combined with the targeted destruction of the national identity of the

Ukrainians of the Donetsk region. It is worth noting that precisely such actions, in many respects, led to the occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine in 2014 and the beginning of the hybrid-informational, terrorist war against Ukraine.

It is during the hybrid information war, including for the artificial split of Ukraine, that the Kremlin leaders and propagandists use any means, especially information zombies of the population of the East of Ukraine. Among this zombie population, peculiar brands like "hated Bandera" and "evil Ukrainians" were actively exaggerated. And the Moscow media only incited a hysteria of the "intransigence" of the "people of Donbass" with the "Kiev junta".

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