

## TRANSFORMATION OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MODERN EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM CRISIS (2014-2018)

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The article is dedicated to the analysis of the Transformation of the Nordic Countries' Foreign Policy Strategies in the Context of the Modern European Security System Crisis (2014-2018). Considering the Nordic cooperation as the basis of a common policy, it is noted that cooperation of these countries should meet the NATO and EU political and institutional requirements, however, alongside with considering and promoting the common interests of the Nordic countries. The purpose of formation and activities of the Nordic Defence Cooperation is to strengthen the national defence of the participating countries, study common synergies of this cooperation and promote efficient common solutions. Cooperation activities complement cooperation in the European Union, NATO and the UN. It is stated, that there are three main opinions among experts regarding the potential and prospects for the development of the Nordic regional security cooperation. The first one is the following: further development of regional cooperation between the Nordic countries will develop and expand. It is emphasized that the leadership structures of the Nordic countries have a great potential and desire to move along this path, but they should cooperate with NATO on security and defence issues. In their research papers, experts mainly provide recommendations on the ways of cooperation quality improvement. The second opinion is that the cooperation is not aimed at further coordination of the common policy, and the cooperation itself is rather binding. In the experts' opinion, this cooperation should remain within the framework of the NATO supplementary structure. They also consider the issue of overall strategic leadership in cooperation between the Nordic countries, which has identified the key common priorities and interests for cooperation between these countries. The third opinion is diametrically opposite. The experts question the existence of the Nordic Defence Cooperation as a whole. They state that in complex security issues, geopolitics historically divides the Nordic region more often than unites it.

## ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНИХ СТРАТЕГІЙ КРАЇН СКАНДИНАВІЇ В УМОВАХ КРИЗИ СУЧАСНОЇ СИСТЕМИ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ

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**Ключові слова:** зовнішня політика, міжнародні відносини, скандинавські країни, європейська система міжнародної безпеки.

У статті проаналізовано процес трансформації зовнішньополітичних безпекових стратегій країн Скандинавії у контексті кризи сучасної системи європейської безпеки. Визначено, що у питаннях проведення власної безпекової політики кожна із держав Скандинавії дотримується власної, інколи діаметрально відмінної від сусідньої держави позиції, що викликає складність у виокремленні такого поняття як спільний «скандинавський підхід» у веденні зовнішньої політики. Встановлено, що з 2014 по 2018 рр. відбулась трансформація зовнішньополітичних стратегій кра-

їн Скандинавії. Фінляндія, Швеція, Норвегія та Данія активізували діяльність у зовнішньополітичній сфері та у напрямку безпеки та оборони не тільки в рамках Загальної політики безпеки та оборони Європейського Союзу, а й в регіональному аспекті. Встановлено, що існує три основних думки серед експертів щодо потенціалу та перспектив розвитку скандинавського регіонального безпекового співробітництва. Перша – подальший розвиток регіонального співробітництва країн Скандинавії буде розвиватися та розширюватися. Друга – співробітництво не спрямоване на подальшу координацію спільної політики, а сама співпраця має більш зобов'язуючий характер. Третя – діаметрально протилежна – експерти ставлять під сумнів існування Північноєвропейського оборонного співробітництва взагалі, зважаючи на той факт, що історично геополітика ділить Північний регіон частіше, ніж об'єднує його зі складних питань безпеки.

*Presentation of the problem.* Since 2014, due to systemic violations of the basic principles of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation and the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European security architecture and the security system in Europe have drastically changed. This system crisis requires even more joint efforts of EU Member States. A total lack of interaction between the structures of the Common Security and Defence Policy with the Russian Federation has challenged the preservation of peace on the continent and in the entire world. The events occurring on the territory of Ukraine have confirmed the fact that the existence of a "sanitary zone" between the aggressor country and the European Union can be ceased, and the strategy of the Common Security and Defence Policy will have to stand a severe test.

As far as the security problems of the Nordic countries are concerned, the researchers distinguish a separate group of countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. It is interesting to consider these countries according to the level of partnership with the key players in international relations – NATO and the EU, as well as by possible trends of its deepening or, vice versa, weakening. We are now moving to a qualitatively new stage in the development of international relations, with NATO occupying one of the major positions in these transformational processes. The degree of relations development of the Nordic countries with this Euro-Atlantic structure is high: through membership in the Alliance (Denmark, Norway and Iceland) or close cooperation with it (Finland and Sweden). As for the relations of the Nordic countries with the EU in the security and defence area, it should be noted that these countries' degree of integration into the European structures in this context varies depending on the overall level of cooperation of each country with this international organization in order to maintain peace.

In matters of its own security policy implementation, each of the Nordic States used to adhere to its own position, sometimes diametrically different from that of

the neighbouring state, which caused difficulties in distinguishing such a concept as a common "Nordic approach" to foreign policy. However, from 2014 to 2018, the foreign policy strategies of the Nordic countries saw a transformation as a result of the above-mentioned events. Not only did Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark intensify their foreign policy, security and defence activities within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, but they also did it in the regional aspect.

*Review of the related up-to-date academic literature.* A wide range of researches conducted by foreign and Ukrainian scholars is devoted to the issues of formation, effective functioning of structures, institutionalization of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and its further extension. In the article, we considered the works by J. Howorth, a British researcher of the European policy in the area of collective security and defence, who emphasizes on the fact that the Common Security and Defence Policy came a long way, from its creation as the European self-defence to a defence identity under NATO. In the focus of M. Cross, a representative of the Norwegian Institute for Security Studies, there is an issue of security on the European continent based on dozens of interviews<sup>1</sup>, comparison of experiences, culture as well as on frequency of meetings and regulations of this strategy's structures<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Aggestam L. The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation. *Nação e Defesa*. 2007. No. 118-3. P. 206-210.; Dr. Christian Nünlist. URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/center/people/nunlist-christian.html> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; European Security and Defence College (ESDC). URL: <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/4369> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020); European Security and Defence College (ESDC). URL: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Share/People-Organisations/Organisations/European-Security-and-Defence-College-ESDC> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; European Union Military Committee (EUMC). URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5428/european-union-military-committee-eumc\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5428/european-union-military-committee-eumc_en) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>2</sup> Cross M. Cooperation by committee: the EU military committee and the committee for civilian crisis management.

The number of Ukrainian researchers of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy strategy is not abundant. However, among them there is Y. Sedliar, whose studies are worth consideration. In her paper, she examines the implementation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy from its inception to the beginning of the Russian Federation aggression in 2014. The author concludes that the strengthening of the EU military potential fully corresponds to the national interests of the United States, and close cooperation between the European Union and NATO can effectively counter modern challenges and threats to security<sup>1</sup>.

A significant amount of works by foreign researchers dwell on the issue of the Nordic countries' role in the formation of the EU Security Doctrine. Considering each country and its contribution separately, we cannot but say about the authors' commitment to studying Sweden. Special attention should be paid to the research by H. Ojanen, in which she compares the role of Sweden and Finland in shaping the EU Security Doctrine. The author highlights the common and different in these countries' activities and justifies her propositions by referring to the historical past of the countries and their priorities at this stage. She draws attention to the attitude of Sweden and Finland to the formation of the collective security system as a whole, and the intensity of their activities in the framework of this strategy formation.

The specifics of interaction between the Nordic countries in foreign policy have been studied by numerous scholars and covered by the media. Most authors focus on bilateral cooperation as a characteristic feature of interaction between the Nordic countries in foreign policy. For example, in their paper, K. Friis and M. Bredesen investigated the Swedish-Norwegian Defence Cooperation. The authors concluded that the revival of cooperation was due to the emergence of new security conditions to increase the crisis probability in the North Baltic region, which is likely to cover all the Nordic States, regardless of their membership in NATO or the European Union<sup>2</sup>.

The current researches of this topical also include the issue of the Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine. They analyse the behaviour of the Nordic countries within this period and highlight the tendency towards combining cooperation in these countries in the areas of security and defence. Among contemporary researches, the works by J. Godzimirski and T. Iso-Markku are of special interest<sup>3</sup>. For example, J. Godzimirski also studies the issues of how the events in Ukraine have influenced the discussions and policies in the Nordic countries, how new issues are being addressed in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland.

The reference point for the activities of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was the report by T. Stoltenberg, in which he presented proposals for improvement and strengthening of cooperation in security and defence between the Nordic countries. Based on the historical past, analytical references, statistical data and other sources, he developed 13 effective proposals, which were included in the document establishing NORDEFCO.

The assessments of the potential and prospects for the development of the Nordic Defence Cooperation and certain forecasts on this issue are presented in the papers by H. Saxi & K. Friis, T. Iso-Markku, E. Innola & T. Tiilikainen, I. Liegis & A. Rikveilis, and C. Nünlist. Saxi analyses NORDEFCO before and after 2014, puts forward recommendations for its expanding and is a proponent of this organization<sup>4</sup>. Other authors are not so positive in their forecasts regarding the prospects for NORDEFCO development. Thus, for example, Iso-Markku and his co-authors consider this cooperation to be a NATO auxiliary structure, justifying this opinion by historical, cultural and institutional differences. However, the authors define it as an important element in the overall development of cooperation between the countries<sup>5</sup>.

*The purpose of the present article* is to determine the features of formation and functioning of the Nordic model of Security and Regional Defence Cooperation as well as to analyse the transformation of foreign policy strategies of the Nordic countries in the context of the modern European security system crisis.

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EU Institute for Security Studies. *Occasional paper*. 2010. No. 82. P. 25-27.

<sup>1</sup> Седляр Ю. Формування спільної європейської політики у галузі безпеки та оборони (1945-2014 рр.). *Науковий вісник Миколаївського національного університету імені В.О. Сухомлинського*. 2016. № 1(41). С. 91-97.

<sup>2</sup> The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433_en) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

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<sup>3</sup> Godzimirski J.M. Nordic countries and Russia after 2014. *Commentary*. 2017. P. 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Saxi H.L., Friis K. After Crimea: The future of Nordic Defence Cooperation. *NUPI Policy Brief*. 2018. No. 6. P. 1-6.

<sup>5</sup> Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence on 17 March 1948, Brussels. URL: [https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc\\_files/Brussels%20Treaty.pdf](https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Brussels%20Treaty.pdf) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

*Results and discussion.* The idea of a common defence policy for Europe dates back to 1948, when the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty<sup>1</sup>. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, it became obvious that the European Union should take responsibility for conflict prevention and crisis management. Thus, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, confirmed the implementation of the strategy of the Common Security and Defence Policy, which replaced the Western European Union<sup>2</sup>.

The Common Security and Defence Policy enables the European Union to take the lead in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security. A comprehensive approach to solving the tasks set is provided by the system's political and military structures.

The first structure created was the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a so-called "trigger mechanism", which secured the basis for the European Security and Defence Policy as well as the commonality of foreign and security policies. The Committee monitors the developments on the international arena within the framework of the Common foreign and security policy, and helps define the vector of the European Union's foreign policy. The creation of the Committee was a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam, after which the establishment of the PSC was agreed in principle in December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council<sup>3</sup>.

The following structures, namely the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the European Union Military Staff also help in activities of the Political and Security Committee<sup>4</sup>.

Due to expansion of activities within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, there was a period of emergence of new institutions, which were complementary to the main structures mentioned in the previous paragraph. New structured units were created to help implement this policy and expand the functionality of the security policy. They are as follows: the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the European Union Satellite Centre and the European Union Operations Centre (EU OPCEN).

In fact, unlike Denmark, the other Nordic countries do not have land boundaries with the main European region of the EU Member States. Historically, the Nordic countries are newcomers to the integration process. However, they play an important role in the foreign and security policy of the European Union, which is expressed in their interest in the external borders of the European Union and in their desire to participate in the development of anti-crisis management and defence.

Despite the policy of military non-alignment of Sweden and Finland, they do not deny participation in joint activities of international cooperation in the security area, including military cooperation. These countries supported the Petersberg tasks (rescue operations, peacekeeping operations and the use of armed forces to resolve crisis situations) and joined other initiatives in ensuring further development of crisis management. In the discussion of autonomous crisis management, the question arose as for the need for a UN mandate to conduct it. For Finland, and especially for Sweden, the mandate served as the guarantor of the rule of international law and UN support. Thus, it was declared that the European Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintenance of international peace and security. In the course of interaction between the European Union and these two countries within the framework of the security strategy, Finland has proved to be more flexible, attempting to be

<sup>1</sup> Аксьонов П. Якщо завтра війна: чому НАТО не готова до битви з Росією в країнах Балтії. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-44658144> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>2</sup> Iso-Markku T., Innola E., Tiilikainen T. A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment. *Government's analysis, assessment and research activities*. 2018. No. 38. P. 1-58.

<sup>3</sup> Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee (PSC). URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar00005> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>4</sup> Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union. URL: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2001/80\(1\)/oj](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2001/80(1)/oj) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020); Council Decision of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000D0354> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000D0354 (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; Council joint action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency. URL: [https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/COUNCIL\\_JOINT\\_ACTION\\_2004\\_551\\_CFSP.pdf](https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/COUNCIL_JOINT_ACTION_2004_551_CFSP.pdf) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001E0554> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

where it's at, while Sweden has been more outspoken, focusing more on non-alignment and consolidating its positions as neutral. Sweden has shown a lack of initiative in the European structures, for which it has been frequently criticized<sup>1</sup>.

The next country under consideration is Norway. Although it is not a EU member, it has close ties with the Union. Despite the fact it is a Non-member State, it has a certain degree of political influence – access to the decision-making process at the preparatory stage. As part of the European Security and Defence Policy, Norway has established a political dialogue with the European Union and provides staff for certain operations. On March 7, 2006 Norway continued to integrate into the institutions of the European Union as part of this strategy by signing a cooperation agreement with the EDA. However, the institutions of the European Union do not exert any political influence on the decision-making process of Non-member States.

After the end of the Cold War, Denmark started to develop its foreign policy by intensifying it on the international arena. In general, the Danish government expressed its commitment to a Pro-American policy. Therefore, Denmark only ratified the Maastricht Treaty at the second attempt in 1993, refusing to participate in the Common Security and Defence strategy. Overall, Denmark did not play a significant role in cooperation for the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy. However, it should be noted that the refusal to participate in this strategy had no negative consequences for both Denmark and the European Union. This stated the fact that there is no "flow" from the Security and Defence Policy to other policy areas within the framework of European cooperation.

Despite belonging to the same group of countries in the Nordic region, each of them has certain foreign policy priorities that differ from the others'. That is the reason for the experts from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Robin Allers and Rolf Tamnes, to speak about the difficulties of identifying such a concept as the "Nordic approach" for maintaining a common and unambiguous foreign policy strategy. The main deterrent, which they identify, is the Russian Federation. Even before the start of the "Ukrainian crisis" in 2014, they emphasized the

difference in the positions of the Nordic countries by their attitude to the Russian factor<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, Denmark's foreign policy activities demonstrated that Russia did not matter to them, since it is located outside the buffer zone. The absence of an immediate threat also gives more freedom of action to Denmark than to other Nordic States in the use of force to protect its values at the international level. Norway somewhat shares Denmark's attitude to activities on the international arena, but does not feel equally safe from traditional threats that may arise from the activities of the Russian Federation on the European continent. Sweden's foreign policy activity in 2014 was expressed in attempts to strengthen and preserve the European and Transatlantic institutions in order to reduce the influence of the Russian Federation on the region. However, despite the development and improvement of Sweden's military potential for participation in military missions, its activities in these missions are always unpredictable due to the policy of neutrality and alienation. The protection of the Finnish territory has been the main task of Finland within the entire period of the country's existence. The common borders with the Russian Federation make international missions secondary in the country's foreign policy. Finland is closely monitoring the development of Russia's military power, its offensive capabilities and intentions. Despite the fact that membership in the European Union and close contacts with NATO help improve Finnish security, Finland is still extremely cautious in its foreign policy activities<sup>3</sup>.

However, to deny the existence of interaction and commonality in the foreign policy area of the Nordic countries is erroneous. The Nordic countries are actively involved in the development of multilateral solutions to global problems within the UN (especially with regard to climate). Frequently, these countries are major providers of assistance for development and humanitarian aid.

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<sup>2</sup> The NORDEF MCC Action Plan 2015-18. NORDEF. URL: [http://www.nordefco.org/files/141211\\_NORDEF%20MCC%20AP2015-18\\_final.pdf](http://www.nordefco.org/files/141211_NORDEF%20MCC%20AP2015-18_final.pdf) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>3</sup> The centre. The European Union Satellite Centre. URL: [https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/the\\_centre](https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/the_centre) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433_en) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Finland. URL: <https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/international-activities/the-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; The NORDEF MCC Action Plan 2015-18. NORDEF. URL: [http://www.nordefco.org/files/141211\\_NORDEF%20MCC%20AP2015-18\\_final.pdf](http://www.nordefco.org/files/141211_NORDEF%20MCC%20AP2015-18_final.pdf) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

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<sup>1</sup> Ojanen H. Participation and influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam development of the CFSP. *The Institute for Security Studies*. 2000. No. 11. P. 3-12.; Olsen G.R., Pilegaard J. The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy. *European Security*. 2006. No. 14-3. P. 344-348.

The idea of closer cooperation in the foreign policy and security area between these countries has attracted increased attention since the late 2000s. Since 2014, with the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the Nordic region has been at the core of political confrontation between Russia and Western States, which indicates intensified military activity in the Nordic countries.

In recent years, the bilateral component of cooperation between the Nordic countries has grown in importance. The deepening of cooperation between Finland and Sweden in the defence area is a striking example of this process. Norway and Denmark have contributed to the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which is a NATO forward deployed defence and deterrence military posture to support the allies most vulnerable to Russia (Lithuania and Estonia), providing 200 soldiers each for NATO troops. From 2014, bilateral cooperation between Norway and Sweden started to acquire a positive vector. Within the NATO framework, Norway and Sweden have cooperated to enhance security in the region. Sweden and Denmark have also deepened their bilateral defence cooperation. In general, the Nordic countries have a successful long-term experience in the defence and security area. The creation of the Nordic Defence Cooperation succeeded the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN), which was later replaced by the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), the Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC) and the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP)<sup>1</sup>.

The initial point in the creation of the Nordic Defence Cooperation was the report of Norway's former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, prepared on behalf of the Nordic foreign ministers in 2008 and published in 2009. The Nordic Defence Cooperation was founded on November 4, 2009 in Helsinki, where the Nordic defence ministers signed the Memorandum of Understanding, as a comprehensive framework for cooperation between the Nordic countries in the defence area. The NORDEF structure is a cooperation structure, not a command structure. Cooperation activities initiated from top or bottom are facilitated and agreed within the structure, but the actual realization and

participation in activities remain national decisions.

The Nordic Defence Cooperation was initially aimed at improving economic efficiency. The states sought to work together, training their soldiers, buying new equipment and logistics for their troops in order to increase effectiveness of the army, navy and aviation of the Nordic countries. This cooperation should complement cooperation in the European Union, NATO and the United Nations.

The main aim of the Nordic Defence Cooperation is "...to strengthen the participating nations' national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions"<sup>2</sup>.

The annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 and further deterioration of Western-Russian relations changed the attitude towards the Nordic Defence Cooperation. Therefore, in the same year, the countries agreed to develop a joint vision within the cooperation framework until 2020. Today, this organization is an opportunity to solve urgent security problems in the Nordic region. The Nordic States generally believe that their security in the European region has deteriorated mainly due to the aggressive military activities of the Russian Federation<sup>3</sup>.

Currently, Nordic security experts share the opinion that the new security situation that has emerged and is being faced by the Nordic countries is and should be a key factor in the modern Nordic Defence Cooperation.

In his paper, Hokun Lunde Sashi from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies states that the Nordic Defence Cooperation has a variety of areas of influence and cooperation levels, and therefore there is no special need to generate changes in its activities<sup>4</sup>. Sashi believes that the Nordic countries should continue to work on dissemination of numerous agreements and arrangements to be used not only within peace

<sup>1</sup> Stoltenberg T. Proposal presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009. *Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation*. 2009. P. 1-36.; The centre. The European Union Satellite Centre. URL: [https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/the\\_centre](https://www.satcen.europa.eu/page/the_centre) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>2</sup> The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433_en) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).; The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Finland. URL: <https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/international-activities/the-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>3</sup> Rieker P. Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian Participation in the EU's Security Policy. *European Security*, 2006. Vol. 15. No. 3. P. 284-291.; Sashi H.L. So Similar, Yet So Different: Explaining Divergence in Nordic Defence Policies. *Common or Divided Security?* 2014. P. 258-277.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Christian Nünlist. URL: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/center/people/nuenlist-christian.html> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020); European Security and Defence College (ESDC). URL: <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/4369> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

time, but also in crisis situations and during war. He emphasizes that the Nordic countries' leadership structures have a great potential and desire to continue along that path<sup>1</sup>. Considering the Nordic cooperation in the framework of regional cooperation, the expert says that there is a need for cooperation with NATO. To implement an effective security and defence policy for the Northern Europe and Baltic region, Sashi supports the desire of all the Nordic countries to cooperate with other countries, such as the United States, Great Britain and Germany.

Thomas Iso-Markku from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) sticks to the opposite standpoint regarding the significance and prospects for development of the Nordic Defence Cooperation. He agrees that due to the 2014 events, the cooperation of the Nordic countries has become a necessary factor for the regional security and a priority area; on the other hand, their cooperation is aimed at exchanging views and information rather than further policy coordination. In his work, Iso-Markku considers cooperation of the countries in the regional dimension as complementary for the European Union or NATO. Given the desire of the UK to exit the European Union, increased US influence and the Russian Federation aggression in the East of the European continent, Iso-Markku is careful about forecasting further cooperation between the Nordic countries, its dynamics and efficiency, since the situation on the international arena is currently particularly complicated to predict.

In 2018, Thomas Iso-Markku together with his colleagues Eeva Innola and Teija Tiilikainen published a joint research "A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment." In their report, they identify political, institutional and cultural constraints for the countries' cooperation in the security and defence area. The experts state that the further the foreign policy cooperation of the countries is from the Nordic region, the better it functions. Here, we can see the idea of Iso-Markku that this cooperation mainly complements the main "alliances", namely: NATO – for Denmark, Norway and Iceland; the European Union – for Finland and Sweden<sup>2</sup>.

In their research paper, Imants Liegis and Airis Rikveilis from the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia emphasized that the geographic location of the region may result in problems related to Russia. Therefore, this leads to an increased focus on the main NATO functions. In the authors' opinion, NATO should remain the guarantor of security in the region of the Nordic and Baltic countries, and regional cooperation of these countries should be subordinate to it. As a consequence of this primary priority, the suggestions that the primary responsibility for defence and security can and have to be regional should be rejected firmly. Cooperation models should be open and flexible to include countries outside the Nordic and Baltic States<sup>3</sup>.

Christian Nünlist, senior researcher at the Centre for Security Studies (Zurich, Switzerland), draws attention to the fact that as far as complicated security issues are concerned, geopolitics historically divides the Nordic region more often than unites it. The Nordic security priorities were not fully agreed upon by the Nordic countries, thus, each country maintained its own foreign policy guidelines. Nünlist says that he has no grounds to assert that the Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine has radically changed the Nordic cooperation in the defence sector. Russia's actions have only brought together and directed various geopolitical prospects of the Nordic countries towards a more unified path<sup>4</sup>.

Like previous experts, Nünlist believes that the Nordic countries' cooperation in the security and defence area should be carried out within the framework of NATO and the European Union. The expert also emphasizes on intensification of NATO activities<sup>5</sup>.

Thus, in their foreign policy strategies, the Nordic countries consider one area of cooperation within the framework of the European strategy for the Common Security and Defence policy, which includes creation and functioning of various structures. The role of the Nordic countries in

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strategic environment as a catalyst for greater unity? *FIIA Briefing paper*. 2018. No. 234. P. 2-7.

<sup>3</sup> European Union Military Committee (EUMC). URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5428/european-union-military-committee-eumc\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5428/european-union-military-committee-eumc_en) (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

<sup>4</sup> Aggestam L. The European Internationalist: Sweden and European Security Cooperation. *Nação e Defesa*. 2007. No. 118-3. P. 206-210.

<sup>5</sup> Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 2 October 1997. URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf> (дата звернення: 17.06.2020).

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<sup>1</sup> Karlsson J. Denmark, Sweden and the CFSP. *Lunds universitet*. 2006. P. 33-34.; Liegis I., Rikveilis A. Nordic-Baltic Security: How relevant is NATO? *Atlantic Council Program on International Security*. 2011. P. 16-21.

<sup>2</sup> Iso-Markku T., Innola E., Tiilikainen T. A Stronger North? Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy in a new security environment. *Government's analysis, assessment and research activities*. 2018. No. 38. P. 1-58.; Iso-Markku T. Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation: The new

shaping the European Union's security doctrine is determined by the foreign policy guidelines that the Nordic countries have developed in the course of their historical development. For example, Sweden and Finland have actively participated in joint international security cooperation activities, in particular, those of a European nature. The fact that Norway is not a EU member, but is a NATO member, hindered its initiatives in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Norway is considered to be more integrated into the European collective security strategy than Denmark. Norway is integrating into the institutions of the European Union within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, Denmark remained on the side-lines on its own initiative. In general, Denmark did not play a significant role in the development of this strategy. However, Denmark is an active player in cooperation with NATO on the international arena.

Considering the Nordic cooperation as the basis of a common policy, it is important to note that cooperation of these countries should meet the NATO and EU political and institutional requirements, however, alongside with considering and promoting the common interests of the Nordic countries. The purpose of formation and activities of the Nordic Defence Cooperation has been and is to strengthen the national defence of the participating countries, study common synergies of this cooperation and promote efficient common solutions. Cooperation activities complement cooperation in the European Union, NATO and the UN.

There are three main opinions among experts regarding the potential and prospects for the development of the Nordic regional security cooperation. The first one is the following: further development of regional cooperation between the Nordic countries will develop and expand. It is emphasized that the leadership structures of the Nordic countries have a great potential and desire

to move along this path, but they should cooperate with NATO on security and defence issues. In their research papers, experts mainly provide recommendations on the ways of cooperation quality improvement. The second opinion is that the cooperation is not aimed at further coordination of the common policy, and the cooperation itself is rather binding. In the experts' opinion, this cooperation should remain within the framework of the NATO supplementary structure. They also consider the issue of overall strategic leadership in cooperation between the Nordic countries, which has identified the key common priorities and interests for cooperation between these countries. The third opinion is diametrically opposite. The experts question the existence of the Nordic Defence Cooperation as a whole. They state that in complex security issues, geopolitics historically divides the Nordic region more often than unites it.

Overall, the security area of the Nordic countries' foreign policy is shaped by their relations with NATO, the EU, the UN and the Nordic regional security structures. NATO and the EU exert the greatest influence on the shaping of this foreign policy vector in the Nordic countries. Denmark is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The country occupies an important strategic position, which is primarily determined by the fact that it is located in the area of the strait connecting the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and provides access to the Baltic States in the Atlantic. During the Cold war, NATO was the cornerstone of the Danish security and defence policy, although Denmark, like neighbouring Norway, did not deploy military bases and nuclear weapons on its territory in the peacetime and restricted other states' military activities on the island of Bornholm. With the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, the country's security policy changed and it became more active both as a NATO member and as a Western partner of the Eastern European and Baltic countries.

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